242 A.3d 1188
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2020Background
- SHA pre-certified Faddis’s Downingtown plant and approved a sample panel in Sept. 2013; Brawner was the prime contractor on the I‑95 noise‑barrier project and subcontracted production of panels to Faddis (purchase order, Feb. 2013).
- SHA inspectors later found production and quality problems (including use of unapproved aggregate and altered test data); SHA suspended purchases and notified Brawner in May 2014.
- Faddis sent letters in June 2014 asking Brawner to forward claims to SHA; Brawner’s May 8, 2014 letter reserved rights but did not present a claim on Faddis’s behalf.
- Faddis sued Brawner in federal court (July 2015) alleging Brawner refused to "pass through" Faddis’s claims to SHA; Brawner forwarded the federal complaint to SHA on Aug. 11, 2015 (which SHA treated as a notice of claim).
- MSBCA granted SHA summary disposition: (1) Faddis, as a subcontractor with no direct procurement contract with SHA, lacked standing to file directly; (2) any pass‑through claim by Brawner on Faddis’s behalf was untimely (notice not filed within 30 days). The Circuit Court reversed; the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court and remanded to affirm MSBCA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Faddis is a "procurement contractor" with standing to file a direct contract claim against SHA | Faddis: SHA’s pre‑certification and sample approval created an agreement/contract and made Faddis a procurement contractor eligible to sue directly | SHA: A "procurement contract" requires a direct contract with the procurement agency; pre‑approval does not create such a contract | Held: Pre‑approval/certification is not a procurement contract; Faddis lacked standing to file directly |
| Whether Brawner timely filed a pass‑through notice of claim on behalf of Faddis | Brawner/Faddis: May 8 letter or other communications created factual disputes so timeliness requires a full hearing | SHA: No written pass‑through notice was filed within 30 days of the claim’s accrual; August 2015 notice was too late | Held: No timely pass‑through notice; statutory 30‑day requirement violated; claim dismissed as untimely |
| Interpretation of "procurement contract" and waiver of sovereign immunity | Faddis: statutory definitions (procurement/procurement contract) encompass pre‑approval/eligibility arrangements | SHA: Waiver of sovereign immunity is narrow; Legislature requires a written/direct contract with the agency to invoke contract remedies | Held: Waiver construed narrowly; procurement contract requires direct contractual relationship with the State |
| Appropriateness of MSBCA summary disposition | Faddis/Brawner: factual disputes exist (timeliness, whether May 8 constituted notice) and summary disposition improper | SHA: Record documents are dispositive; no genuine issue of material fact | Held: MSBCA correctly granted summary disposition; documents establish lack of standing and untimeliness |
Key Cases Cited
- Comptroller v. Science Applications, 405 Md. 185 (2008) (standard of appellate review of administrative agency decisions)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Pollard, 466 Md. 531 (2019) (confirms review standard for agency decisions)
- Engineering Management v. State Highway Administration, 375 Md. 211 (2003) (timeliness of claims and evidentiary hearing context)
- ARA Health v. Dept. of Public Safety, 344 Md. 85 (1996) (Legislature may waive sovereign immunity directly or by necessary implication)
- Katz v. Washington Sub. San. Comm’n, 284 Md. 503 (1979) (background on Maryland sovereign immunity)