State ex rel. Whitaker v. Satterfield, 386 S.W.3d 893

Petition filed to civilly commit Relator as a sexually violent predator (SVP) in Pemiscot County; Relator challenged the predicate offense as not a sexually violent offense.
Relator pled guilty in 1985 to sexual assault in the first degree, a Class C felony under then-existing statute §566.040; he was twenty at the time.
SVP Act defines SVP as a person with a mental abnormality and who pled guilty or was found guilty of a sexually violent offense.
Statutory definitions: §632.480(5) defines SVP; §682.480(4) lists specific offenses constituting a sexually violent offense.
Issue before the court was whether Relator’s 1985 offense qualifies as a sexually violent offense under §632.480(4); the court concluded it does not.
The preliminary order in prohibition directed dismissal if the offense did not qualify, and the court made its order absolute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 1985 offense qualifies as a sexually violent offense	Whitaker's offense is labeled ‘sexual assault’ and should fit §632.480(4)	Respondent argues ‘sexual assault’ includes all related offenses	Not a sexually violent offense; dismissal ordered

In re Care and Treatment of Holtcamp, 259 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. banc 2008) (statutory interpretation and narrow tailoring of SVP statute)
State ex rel. Norton v. Thompson, 123 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. banc 2003) (civil commitment right-of-liberty considerations; narrow tailoring)
State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. banc 2010) (statutory term interpretation; use of precise terms in statutes)
State v. Brown, 636 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. banc 1982) (savings clause impact on pre-1979 rape convictions; statutory interpretation framework)
In re Gormon, 371 S.W.3d 100 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (distinguishable; pre-1998 definitions and savings clause considerations)
State v. Gibson, 122 S.W.3d 121 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (discussion of savings clause and related offenses)