State ex rel. Veskrna v. Steel
296 Neb. 581
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Les W. Veskrna requested Judicial Branch Education (JBE) records (materials, presenter identities, contracts, communications) for programs on child custody and parenting time since July 1, 2012; State Court Administrator Corey Steel denied the request.
- Steel asserted an unwritten Committee policy keeping JBE records confidential and relied on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-205.01 and Neb. Ct. R. § 1-512(A) as authorizing confidentiality.
- Veskrna sued for a writ of mandamus under the Nebraska Public Records Act, arguing the records are public and not privileged; he sought only program materials and presenter identities, not judges’ attendance or in-session comments.
- The district court conducted in camera review of 12 records, concluded most were public and ordered disclosure with a redaction of one judge email as privileged; it denied summary judgment to Steel.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: statutory authorization to develop confidentiality rules does not itself exempt records from the public records definition; the judicial deliberative process privilege is narrow and did not protect the exhibited JBE documents (except the redacted email), and disclosure did not unduly impair judicial functions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Veskrna) | Defendant's Argument (Steel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are the requested JBE documents public records under §84‑712.01? | Yes — public records statute broadly covers records of any branch; no statutory exemption applies. | No — Committee practice and statutory language permitting development of confidentiality rules removes these records from the public‑records definition. | Held: Documents are public; an authorizing statute to develop confidentiality rules is not itself an express statutory prohibition on disclosure. |
| Does §24‑205.01 (and Ct. R. §1‑512) itself exempt JBE records from disclosure? | N/A (Veskrna argues no exemption exists). | The statute authorizes the Committee to develop rules re: confidentiality, so records are not public. | Held: The statute only contemplates future rulemaking; absent adopted rules, it does not expressly make records nonpublic. |
| Does application of the Public Records Act violate separation of powers by unduly impairing the judiciary’s essential functions? | Disclosure of these administrative JBE materials does not impair essential judicial functions. | Disclosure would undermine judicial independence and the integrity of judicial education; confidentiality is essential. | Held: No undue interference here — balance favors disclosure for these records because they have only a tenuous connection to judges’ mental processes. |
| Do the records fall under the judicial deliberative process privilege? | Most documents are administrative and not privileged; privilege applies only to materials revealing judges’ mental impressions. | Judicial education materials are closely tied to deliberation and therefore privileged. | Held: Adopted a narrow, absolute judicial deliberative‑process privilege but it applies only to materials revealing judges’ mental impressions or internal deliberations; the exhibited JBE documents (except a redacted judge email) do not fall within the privilege. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Unger v. State, 293 Neb. 549 (recognizing public records remedies under Nebraska law)
- State v. Ellsworth, 61 Neb. 444 (1901) (application of public records principles to judicial records)
- United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (limits on absolute executive privilege; contextual guide for confidentiality claims)
- In re Enforcement of Subpoena, 463 Mass. 162 (2012) (description/adoption of judicial deliberations privilege)