State ex rel. Veskrna v. Steel, 296 Neb. 581

Background

Les W. Veskrna requested Judicial Branch Education (JBE) materials (agendas, presenter IDs, slides, handouts, emails, etc.) on child custody/parenting-time programs since July 1, 2012; State Court Administrator Corey R. Steel denied the request citing a Committee policy of confidentiality and statutes/rules contemplating confidentiality.
Veskrna sued for a writ of mandamus under Nebraska’s public records law to compel disclosure; Steel defended on statutory-exception, separation-of-powers, and judicial deliberative-privilege grounds.
The district court conducted in camera review of 12 documents (exhibit 4), found most were public records, redacted one judge email under a deliberative-process theory, and ordered disclosure; Steel appealed and Veskrna cross‑appealed limited evidentiary rulings.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed whether (a) an unwritten Committee policy or the statutes authorizing rulemaking exempt JBE records from the public‑records definition, (b) disclosure violated separation of powers, and (c) the judicial deliberative privilege barred disclosure.
The Court held the statute authorizing the Committee to develop confidentiality rules did not itself make JBE records non‑public, found the particular records did not implicate core judicial deliberations, affirmed disclosure with a single redaction, and affirmed costs/fees.

Issues

Issue	Veskrna (Plaintiff) Argument	Steel (Defendant) Argument	Held
1) Are the requested JBE records "public records" under §84‑712.01?	Records fit the statutory definition; no statutory exemption applies.	An authorizing statute (§24‑205.01) and court rule language about confidentiality, together with the Committee’s unwritten policy, mean those records are not "public records."	The rulemaking‑authorization statute is not an "expressly provide[d]" exemption; absent adopted court rules, the documents are public.
2) Does compelled disclosure violate separation of powers by impairing judicial functions?	Disclosure of administrative JBE materials does not meaningfully impair judicial functions.	Judicial education is essential; mandatory confidentiality is needed to protect independence and deliberation.	Separation‑of‑powers permits disclosure here because the materials have only a tenuous link to judges’ mental processes and do not meaningfully impair core judicial functions.
3) Does the judicial deliberative‑process privilege bar disclosure of the requested JBE records?	Most JBE materials are administrative, not part of deliberations in particular cases; privilege doesn’t apply.	Judicial deliberative privilege should extend to JBE because education is closely tied to decisionmaking.	Court adopts a narrowly tailored, absolute judicial deliberations privilege protecting judges’ mental impressions and intra‑judicial confidential communications in particular cases; but the exhibit 4 documents do not fall within it except for one judge email that was redacted.
4) Were the district court’s evidentiary/admission and remedy rulings erroneous (including award of fees)?	Admission of paragraph 12 of McMahon‑Boies’ affidavit and other rulings were erroneous.	District court properly considered affidavits and exercised discretion; remedy (mandamus and fees) was appropriate.	District court’s rulings affirmed; writ of mandamus granted (with redaction) and costs/fees affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

State ex rel. Unger v. State, 293 Neb. 549, 878 N.W.2d 540 (2016) (public‑records mandamus procedure and standards)
State v. Ellsworth, 61 Neb. 444, 85 N.W. 439 (1901) (application of public‑records principles to judicial records)
State ex rel. Griggs v. Meeker, 19 Neb. 106, 26 N.W. 620 (1886) (early recognition of public access to certain court records)
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (limits on broad claims of privilege and emphasis on narrowly construed exceptions)
In re Enforcement of Subpoena, 463 Mass. 162, 972 N.E.2d 1022 (2012) (formulation of the judicial deliberations privilege adopted as persuasive model)