2016 Ohio 5584
Ohio2016Background
- Ullmann, a private citizen who previously served as counsel or amicus in related suits, filed an original action in mandamus challenging the constitutionality of the JobsOhio Act and seeking to void JobsOhio and the JobsOhio Beverage System and to compel various state officers to act (dissolve entities, audit, cancel filings).
- She asked the secretary of state to cancel JobsOhio’s articles, the governor to dissolve the entities and return property, the auditor to audit assets, and the attorney general to appoint her retroactively as special counsel or to commence quo warranto.
- Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of standing; the magistrate and the court of appeals dismissed Ullmann’s complaint for lack of standing.
- Ullmann appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court and requested oral argument; the court denied oral argument as the standing issue had been addressed in ProgressOhio.org.
- The Supreme Court applied traditional standing rules and the public-right doctrine (Sheward), concluded Ullmann lacked both traditional and public-right standing, and affirmed the dismissal. Justice O’Neill dissented, arguing Ullmann should have public-right standing to challenge diversion of public funds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ullmann has traditional (personal) standing to seek mandamus and declaratory relief invalidating JobsOhio | Ullmann alleged she is a citizen, taxpayer, business owner/consultant, elector, and recent purchaser of spirits, and claimed injury because liquor purchasers fund JobsOhio | Respondents argued Ullmann alleged no concrete, particularized injury traceable to defendants that mandamus relief would redress | Court: Ullmann waived most traditional-standing claims and did not allege a concrete injury; no traditional standing |
| Whether Ullmann qualifies under the public‑right doctrine to bring an original mandamus action challenging JobsOhio’s constitutionality | Ullmann relied on public‑right doctrine (Sheward) and Trauger to assert citizen standing to force action when AG has conflict and to address a matter of public importance | Respondents relied on ProgressOhio.org and Sheward: public‑right doctrine is limited (rare/extraordinary public injury) and, per ProgressOhio.org, applies only to original mandamus/prohibition and requires showing of rare, extraordinary public‑interest injury | Court: Ullmann lacks public‑right standing; ProgressOhio.org controls and her allegations do not meet the ‘‘rare and extraordinary’’ standard |
| Whether Trauger supports mandamus by private citizen compelling AG to act when AG declines quo warranto | Ullmann argued Trauger permits private citizens to compel officials to act when conflicts prevent AG action | Respondents noted Trauger involved a ministerial appointment duty; R.C. 2733.04 gives the AG discretion to determine whether quo warranto can be established | Court: Trauger does not support Ullmann because R.C. 2733.04 vests discretionary judgment in the AG |
| Whether oral argument is warranted | Ullmann requested oral argument citing public importance | Respondents opposed; court noted standing issue had been addressed in ProgressOhio.org | Court: Oral argument denied as unnecessary because issue previously decided in ProgressOhio.org |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St.3d 520 (2014) (limits public‑right doctrine and rejects plaintiffs’ challenge to JobsOhio for failure to show ‘‘rare and extraordinary’’ public‑interest injury)
- State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451 (1999) (articulates public‑right exception permitting litigants to raise rare and extraordinary public‑interest claims in original mandamus/prohibition)
- Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 115 Ohio St.3d 375 (2007) (sets traditional standing test: injury, traceability, redressability)
- Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55 (2012) (explains standing depends on personal stake rather than merits)
- Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St.3d 287 (2012) (standing requires a personal stake to have a court hear the case)
- State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176 (1974) (discusses entitlement to bring public‑interest claims)
- State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. (1902) (historical precedent where mandamus compelled a ministerial appointment; distinguished here because AG’s quo warranto duty is discretionary)