State ex rel Town of Tiverton v. James Pelletier State ex rel Town of Tiverton v. Melissa Pelletier James Pelletier v. Town of Tiverton
14-123, 14-124, 14-298
| R.I. | Dec 15, 2017Background
- James and Melissa Pelletier owned a 30-acre R-80 zoned parcel in Tiverton and operated a nursery and a landscaping business (Tiger Tree LLC).
- Town enforcement observed large piles of organic materials (manure, woodchips, yard waste), industrial equipment (dump trucks, loaders, trommel, excavators), and evidence compost was mixed and steamed on-site; some material was delivered from off-site and some compost went off-site with plants.
- Municipal Court found defendants manufactured compost in an R-80 zone in violation of Tiverton Zoning Ordinance Article IV § 13(a); defendants appealed and received a de novo Superior Court bench trial.
- At Superior Court, town witnesses (DEM inspector, zoning official, neighbor) corroborated large-scale composting and industrial processing; defendants presented testimony that composting was natural and an expert who opined it was not an industrial manufacture.
- The trial justice denied a Rule 29 motion, found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants were manufacturing/processing compost using heavy equipment and off-site inputs in excess of nursery needs, and convicted them under § 13(a).
- Defendants raised multiple issues on appeal; this Court limited review to preserved issues and affirmed the Superior Court judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Town) | Defendant's Argument (Pelletier) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants were "manufacturing/processing" compost in violation of Article IV § 13(a) | Activities (trucked-in materials, heavy equipment, trommel, produced compost used off-site) constitute industrial manufacturing/processing prohibited in R-80 | Composting is a natural biological process, not "manufacturing"; no packaging/sale of compost as product | Held: Conduct constituted manufacturing/processing; conviction affirmed |
| Whether composting could be a permitted accessory use to a nursery under § 3(a) | Accessory use does not exempt industrial manufacturing/processing; § 13(a) expressly prohibits such activities | Compost used in the nursery is incidental and thus accessory to permitted nursery use | Held: Incidental compost use may be accessory, but large-scale industrial manufacturing is not permitted |
| Vagueness challenge to § 13(a) for lack of definitions for "manufacture" and "compost" | Ordinance language is clear in prohibiting manufacturing/processing; plain meaning applies | Terms are undefined and thus unconstitutionally vague | Held: Challenge not preserved at trial; alternatively, ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague when given plain/common-sense meaning |
| Sufficiency of evidence after Rule 29 motion | Evidence (witnesses, photos, admissions, equipment, off-site deliveries/shipments) meets proof beyond a reasonable doubt | Evidence insufficient; defense witnesses and expert testimony contradicted industrial manufacture | Held: Trial justice properly weighed credibility and evidence; denial of Rule 29 and conviction upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Lamarque v. Centreville Savings Bank, 22 A.3d 1136 (R.I. 2011) (standard for disturbing factual findings of trial justice)
- Gianquitti, 22 A.3d 1161 (R.I. 2011) (deference to trial justice factual findings in bench trials)
- State v. McKone, 673 A.2d 1068 (R.I. 1996) (trial justice’s role when ruling on Rule 29 motion in bench trials)
- Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1936) (definition of "manufacture" as transformation of raw materials)
- American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1931) (definition of manufacture; commercial production concept)