State ex rel. Sitton v. Norman, 406 S.W.3d 915

Sitton was convicted in 2005 in Lincoln County of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree and armed criminal action, receiving consecutive terms of seven and 18 years.
Convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal; Sitton did not raise jury-selection defects on direct appeal or in post-conviction relief.
At Sitton’s trial, Lincoln County allowed jurors to opt out by performing community service and paying a $50 fee.
Sitton alleges he learned of the opt-out practice in 2010 after Preston v. State held it violated jury-selection statutes.
Sitton filed a motion for a new trial in October 2010 and later a habeas petition asserting violation of jury-selection statutes; the circuit court and court of appeals denied relief.
The habeas petition now proceeds to this court, with undisputed facts indicating Sitton has not shown prejudice warranting relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the Lincoln County opt-out practice substantially fail to comply with jury statutes?	Sitton argues it's a fundamental/systemic violation per Preston.	State contends no substantial statutory failure and no prejudice shown.	Not a substantial failure; no demonstrated prejudice.
Is Sitton procedurally barred by default or untimeliness from obtaining habeas relief?	Sitton relies on 494.465.1 or cause-and-prejudice to avoid default.	State asserts procedural default bars review.	Undisputed facts show no prejudice; resolution of default is unnecessary.
Whether excusing five prospective jurors from service undermined randomness of the jury pool?	Sitton relies on the opt-out as a systemic deviation from random selection.	State argues the number and context do not show a substantial deviation.	Five excusals did not so interfere as to constitute a substantial failure.
Should the Court align with Preston/Anderson/Gresham in evaluating substantial deviation?	Sitton cites those authorities as controlling on substantial deviation.	State distinguishes these as not controlling in this factual posture.	The cited cases do not compel relief here; no substantial deviation proven.

Preston v. State, 325 S.W.3d 420 (Mo.App.2010) (opt-out jury practice violates jury selection statutes; prejudice analyzed)
State ex rel. Koster v. McCarver, 376 S.W.3d 46 (Mo.App.2012) (habeas relief for unlawful Lincoln County practice; substantial deviation theme)
State v. Anderson, 79 S.W.3d 420 (Mo.banc 2002) (substantial failure may exist without explicit constitutional violation)
Gresham v. State, 637 S.W.2d 20 (Mo.banc 1982) (randomness of jury selection; systematic departures permit relief)
Sardeson v. State, 174 S.W.3d 598 (Mo.App.2005) (computer error affecting jury randomness justified substantial deviation holding)
Hudson v. State, 248 S.W.3d 56 (Mo.App.2008) (computer-age randomness impact as substantial deviation example)
State v. Griffin, 347 S.W.3d 73 (Mo.banc 2011) (habeas scope limited to facial validity of confinement)
State v. McCarver, 376 S.W.3d 46 (Mo.App.2012) (see Koster; relief for jury-selection irregularities)