State ex rel. Pilarczyk v. Geauga Cty. (Slip Opinion), 2019 Ohio 2880

Background

Joshua N. Pilarczyk sustained a 2002 work-related back injury; he later applied (July 2015) for permanent-total-disability (PTD) workers’ compensation after temporary-total benefits ended.
Multiple medical evaluations: treating orthopedist (Dr. Kellis) said Pilarczyk was permanently and totally disabled; musculoskeletal examiner (Dr. Mehta) found sedentary work capacity; psychological exam by Dr. Pecorelli concluded Pilarczyk was incapable of work.
A Bureau-ordered psychological evaluation by Dr. Kenneth Gruenfeld found Pilarczyk at maximum medical improvement (MMI), suggested he could not return to his former job, but also indicated he might be able to work in a low-stress office job and could participate in vocational rehabilitation.
The Industrial Commission denied PTD relief relying on Dr. Gruenfeld’s report (and Dr. Mehta), while omitting Dr. Pecorelli’s contrary opinion; Pilarczyk argued Gruenfeld’s report was equivocal and therefore not evidence the Commission could rely on.
The Tenth District granted a limited writ of mandamus, holding the Commission abused its discretion by relying on an equivocal/ambiguous report; the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, concluding Gruenfeld’s report was ambiguous and could not be used absent clarification.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Pilarczyk)	Defendant's Argument (Industrial Commission)	Held
Whether Dr. Gruenfeld’s psychological report constituted “some evidence” that Pilarczyk could engage in sustained remunerative employment	Gruenfeld’s report is internally inconsistent/ambiguous and therefore equivocal, which renders it non‑probative and not evidence	The report is clear when read in context: it limits "return to work" references to the former job and indicates ability to perform low‑stress office work and accept vocational rehab	Held: Gruenfeld’s report is ambiguous/equivocal as to whether Pilarczyk can perform any work and therefore is not proper evidence unless clarified; judgment of court of appeals affirmed
Whether a court may resolve ambiguity in a medical report or must require clarification from the physician	Court should exclude equivocal reports rather than resolve medical ambiguity itself	Commission urged court to interpret the report in the context of the questions asked	Held: Courts should not speculate about medical meaning; ambiguous medical statements must be clarified by the physician to be admissible evidence
Whether the Commission erred by relying solely on Gruenfeld’s report while ignoring a contrary examining psychologist	Gruenfeld’s report was not proper evidence, so reliance on it (and omission of Pecorelli) was an abuse of discretion	Commission argued Gruenfeld’s report provided sufficient support for denial	Held: Because Gruenfeld’s report is equivocal and was the basis for the denial, the Commission abused its discretion; remand for a clarified opinion or new order required
Whether oral argument was warranted before the Supreme Court	Requested but not shown necessary under Court’s criteria	Commission opposed oral argument	Held: Motion for oral argument denied

Key Cases Cited

State ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp., 70 Ohio St.3d 649 (1994) (equivocal medical opinions are nonprobative and not evidence)
State ex rel. Paragon v. Indus. Comm., 5 Ohio St.3d 72 (1983) (medical reports that are internally inconsistent/ambiguous cannot support PTD determinations)
State ex rel. Manpower of Dayton, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 147 Ohio St.3d 360 (2016) (court reviews Industrial Commission decisions for abuse of discretion and whether they are supported by some evidence)
State ex rel. Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38 (2001) (statement is ambiguous if susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation)
State ex rel. Young v. Indus. Comm., 79 Ohio St.3d 484 (1997) (courts should defer to medical expertise and avoid substituting judicial speculation for medical opinion)
State ex rel. Lopez v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 445 (1994) (similar deference to medical determinations in workers’ compensation context)
State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167 (1987) (nonmedical factors—age, education, work record, psychological and sociological factors—must be considered in PTD determinations)
State ex rel. Galion Mfg. Div., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Haygood, 60 Ohio St.3d 38 (1991) (PTD awards sometimes can rest on medical factors alone; nonmedical factors are considered when medical factors do not conclusively foreclose employment)
State ex rel. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Indus. Comm., 73 Ohio St.3d 525 (1995) (PTD should be reserved for the most severely disabled; requires showing no possibility of re‑employment)
State ex rel. Wilson v. Indus. Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 250 (1997) (PTD compensation is last resort after reasonable avenues for return to employment have failed)