State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Byrd (Slip Opinion), 2022 Ohio 476

Vincent El Alan Parker Bey, an inmate, sent certified public-records requests in Sept. 2018 seeking several journal entries from his 1995 criminal case and the clerk’s records-retention schedule.
Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts Nailah K. Byrd provided one journal entry and later the retention schedule, but did not produce the remaining requested entries; Bey filed for a writ of mandamus in Nov. 2018 under the Public Records Act (R.C. 149.43).
The court of appeals initially denied relief, reasoning (erroneously according to the Ohio Supreme Court) that the Rules of Superintendence, not the Public Records Act, governed inmate requests for court records.
The Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Byrd (Parker Bey I) held the Public Records Act applied and remanded for determination whether Bey was entitled to the records, statutory damages, and costs.
On remand the court of appeals denied the writ, concluding Bey failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8) (requiring an incarcerated requester to obtain the sentencing judge’s approval for records related to a criminal investigation or prosecution) and relying on an affidavit that two entries did not exist and one had been provided.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the denial on appeal, rejecting Bey’s procedural challenges and relying on Bey’s failure to satisfy R.C. 149.43(B)(8) as a sufficient basis to deny mandamus.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Bey)	Defendant's Argument (Byrd)	Held
Did the court of appeals err by "sua sponte" raising R.C. 149.43(B)(8)?	Court improperly acted as advocate by raising an issue Byrd had not argued.	Byrd had raised R.C. 149.43(B)(8) earlier; on remand it was proper to consider.	Court properly considered R.C. 149.43(B)(8); Byrd had raised it in earlier proceedings.
Are res judicata/collateral estoppel barriers to considering R.C. 149.43(B)(8) on remand?	Remand should not permit new defenses; doctrines bar raising new issues.	Issue was preserved because Byrd raised B(8) earlier.	Not barred; premise incorrect because Byrd had previously raised the issue.
Is the affidavit of Laura Black invalid for defective notarization?	Black’s affidavit is not properly notarized and therefore unreliable.	Affidavit supports factual findings that records were provided or do not exist.	Court declined to decide notarization issue as moot—Bey’s failure to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8) independently justified denial.
Did Bey have a clear legal right to the requested journal entries under the Public Records Act?	Bey is entitled to the journal entries sought.	Bey failed to obtain sentencing judge approval required by R.C. 149.43(B)(8); two entries do not exist and one was already provided.	Bey failed to meet R.C. 149.43(B)(8); two records were nonexistent and writ was properly denied.

State ex rel. Harris v. Pureval, 121 N.E.3d 337 (Ohio 2018) (discusses applicability of Public Records Act to court records)
State ex rel. Ware v. Giavasis, 157 N.E.3d 710 (Ohio 2020) (R.C. 149.43(B)(8) requires sentencing-judge approval for incarcerated requesters seeking records related to prosecution)
State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 843 N.E.2d 174 (Ohio 2006) (mandamus is appropriate remedy to enforce Public Records Act)
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 31 N.E.3d 616 (Ohio 2015) (requester must prove by clear and convincing evidence a clear legal right to records and corresponding duty to produce)