State ex rel. O.P. v. State
380 P.3d 69
| Utah Ct. App. | 2016Background
- When O.P. was 17 he was arrested for DUI; about three months later (after turning 18) the State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court for the DUI, and O.P. admitted the allegation.
- The court noted O.P.’s prior juvenile probation history and the probation officer recommended jail; the court ordered 30 days in jail with 27 days suspended, plus a fine and treatment.
- O.P. was turned away from the jail for overcrowding and then suffered a drive-by shooting; the court excused the non-suspended 3 days but left the 27-day suspended term in place.
- O.P. moved to withdraw his admission, arguing it was involuntary because he did not know the court could order adult jail; the juvenile court denied the motion and maintained the suspended 27-day jail term.
- O.P. appealed, arguing the juvenile court lacked authority under Utah Code § 78A-6-117 to commit him to adult jail as an “alternative to detention.” The court considered whether jail could qualify as an “alternative to detention” and whether a person who was a child at offense time but an adult at disposition could be committed to jail.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether juvenile court may order an adult jail term as an “alternative to detention” under § 78A-6-117 | O.P.: Jail is not a permissible “alternative to detention” under statute | State/juvenile court: Jail can be an alternative to detention in appropriate circumstances to serve juvenile court purposes | Court held: Jail can be an “alternative to detention” and was permissible here given statutory purposes and circumstances |
| Whether an individual who was under 18 at offense but 18+ at disposition can be committed to jail | O.P.: Statute forbids committing a “child” to jail, so commitment improper | State: O.P. was a “minor” (18–20) under court jurisdiction at disposition; ban on committing a “child” (<18) does not apply | Court held: Because O.P. was not a “child” at commitment, the statutory prohibition did not bar the jail order |
| Whether the juvenile court misapplied § 78A-6-117 in this case | O.P.: Court misinterpreted the statute and imposed involuntary jail term | Court: The order served juvenile purposes (public safety, accountability) and fits within statutory scheme and recognized exceptions | Court held: No misinterpretation; jail term as suspended alternative to detention was lawful |
| Mootness of appeal (whether challenge is justiciable) | State: Issue moot because jail term was not executed | O.P.: Suspended jail remains and could be imposed if conditions violated, so controversy remains | Court held: Not moot — suspended term could have collateral consequences; court reached merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Department of Human Services v. B.R., 42 P.3d 390 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (standards for reviewing statutory interpretation by juvenile court)
- State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986 (Utah 1999) (start statutory analysis with plain language)
- Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 267 P.3d 863 (Utah 2011) (no need for extra interpretive tools when statute is clear)
- Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981) (mootness and collateral consequence principles)