State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose (Slip Opinion), 2019 Ohio 1329

Background

PSIC sued Novak, L.L.P. and its named partners in Cuyahoga C.P. for an unpaid malpractice-insurance deductible and related expenses.
The partners moved for partial judgment on the pleadings arguing they are not individually liable under the Uniform Partnership Act (R.C. Chapter 1776).
Judge Ambrose denied the motion, reasoning that partners could still be liable with respect to their ownership interest, and allowed the partners to remain defendants.
A jury found Novak breached the contract and awarded PSIC $113,379.
Novak filed a writ of prohibition in the Eighth District, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the partners because R.C. 1776.36–.37 limits partner liability; the court denied the writ.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding Novak failed to show the judge’s exercise of judicial power was unauthorized by law and denying oral argument.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Novak)	Defendant's Argument (Ambrose / PSIC)	Held
Whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over actions against named partners under R.C. Chapter 1776	R.C. 1776.36–.37 patently divest the court of authority to proceed against partners because obligations incurred by an LLP are solely partnership obligations	Common pleas courts have general original jurisdiction over civil breaches; statutes limit partner liability but do not remove court jurisdiction to hear claims against partners	Court held Novak failed to show statutes unambiguously divest jurisdiction; judge properly exercised jurisdiction
Whether lack of a justiciable controversy or standing against partners removes court jurisdiction	Lack of standing/justiciability means no case, so court cannot proceed against partners	Standing/justiciability may affect merits, but do not negate a court’s general subject-matter jurisdiction	Court held justiciability/standing do not defeat general subject-matter jurisdiction; errors are for appeal
Whether a writ of prohibition is appropriate when a judge with general jurisdiction allegedly exceeds statutory authority	Prohibition is appropriate because R.C. Chapter 1776 plainly prohibits actions against partners in this context	Prohibition is extraordinary and applicable only where statute patently and unambiguously removes court authority	Court held prohibition inappropriate absent a clear legislative intent to divest jurisdiction
Whether Novak lacked an adequate remedy at law (appeal)	Novak argued it could not adequately appeal because no final order against partners existed	Court of appeals found an adequate remedy at law existed by appeal	Court accepted that errors in exercise of jurisdiction are reviewable on appeal and denied extraordinary relief

Key Cases Cited

Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314 (Ohio 2002) (standard of review for Civ.R. 56 summary judgment)
State ex rel. Barclays Bank, P.L.C. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 74 Ohio St.3d 536 (Ohio 1996) (prohibition is extraordinary; not granted routinely)
State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89 (Ohio 2015) (elements required for writ of prohibition)
Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86 (Ohio 1972) (definition of subject-matter jurisdiction)
State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 88 Ohio St.3d 447 (Ohio 2000) (common pleas courts’ general jurisdiction over civil actions)
State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein, 153 Ohio St.3d 560 (Ohio 2018) (writ of prohibition available when judge exceeds statutory authority despite general jurisdiction)
State ex rel. Kaylor v. Bruening, 80 Ohio St.3d 142 (Ohio 1997) (statute must patently and unambiguously divest court jurisdiction for prohibition to lie)
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75 (Ohio 2014) (standing affects justiciability but not general subject-matter jurisdiction)
In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205 (Ohio 2006) (errors in exercise of jurisdiction are for appeal)
State ex rel. Sanquily v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 60 Ohio St.3d 78 (Ohio 1991) (example of statute clearly divesting jurisdiction)
State ex rel. Morenz v. Kerr, 104 Ohio St.3d 148 (Ohio 2004) (granting prohibition when statute precludes court action)
State ex rel. Dir. v. Forchione, 148 Ohio St.3d 105 (Ohio 2016) (exclusive statutory authority supporting prohibition)