State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla
238 Ariz. 560
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Defendant Chris Simcox (self-represented) is charged with multiple sexual offenses against two child victims, including Z.S., alleged to have occurred 2012–2013.
- Simcox sought to introduce evidence that Z.S. previously alleged another person ("N.") touched her, arguing it bore on who committed the acts (third-party defense). The State moved to exclude under A.R.S. § 13-1421(A)(5).
- The superior court held an evidentiary hearing and found only that there was clear evidence Z.S. made statements about N.; it declined to find those statements false (required by § 13-1421(A)(5)) or true (required for a third-party defense), and did not assess the § 13-1421(A)(5) balancing fully.
- Z.S.’s legal representative (A.S.) attempted to have her counsel assert victim rights (privacy, objection to cross-examination by defendant) during pretrial proceedings; the superior court limited victim counsel’s participation, citing Lindsay R.
- The State and A.S. filed separate special action petitions challenging the superior court’s rulings. This court accepted special action jurisdiction and reviewed statutory and constitutional issues de novo where applicable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence of Z.S.’s allegation about N. was admissible under A.R.S. § 13-1421(A)(5) (false-allegations clause) | State: § 13-1421(A)(5) requires a finding the allegations were false and a probative/prejudicial balancing; superior court did not satisfy statute | Simcox: statements were made and relevant for impeachment/third-party defense; admissible | Court vacated the superior court’s ruling admitting the evidence under § 13-1421(A)(5); record lacks required findings (falsity and statutory balancing) |
| Whether Simcox could rely on § 13-1421(A)(3) (motive-to-accuse) | State: not raised below; § 13-1421(A)(3) requirements unmet | Simcox: evidence shows motive or supports impeachment (argued on appeal) | Court noted Simcox did not raise this in trial court and record does not show clear-and-convincing proof of relevance or that prejudicial effect is outweighed; § 13-1421(A)(3) not supported on this record |
| Whether victim’s private counsel may assert victim rights in pretrial proceedings (VBR/VRIA conflict with Lindsay R.) | A.S.: Lindsay R. does not preclude private counsel from asserting victims’ rights in pretrial; victim has statutory standing to seek orders and be represented | State: prosecutor generally controls prosecution and presentation; victims are not parties | Court held victim (through counsel) has standing under A.R.S. § 13-4437(A) to seek orders and to appear; superior court erred by prohibiting victim counsel from asserting victim rights in pretrial proceedings |
| Whether special action jurisdiction is appropriate | State/A.S.: special action appropriate because no adequate remedy by appeal; children’s interests implicated | Simcox: did not seek special action | Court accepted special action jurisdiction and granted relief, remanding for proceedings consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Lindsay R. v. Cohen, 236 Ariz. 565, 343 P.3d 435 (App. 2015) (victim counsel may not usurp prosecutor’s role; prosecutor does not "represent" the victim)
- State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz. 396, 998 P.2d 1069 (App. 2000) (discusses standards for admitting prior sexual conduct evidence)
- State ex rel. Montgomery v. Duncan, 228 Ariz. 514, 269 P.3d 690 (App. 2011) (relevancy alone does not override victim rights)
- State v. Lamberton, 183 Ariz. 47, 899 P.2d 939 (1995) (VBR and VRIA give victims rights to participate and be notified)
- State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 349 P.3d 200 (2015) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)