State ex rel. Louie v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.
921 F. Supp. 2d 1059
D. Haw.2013Background
- Attorney General of Hawaii filed six identical state-law UDAP and related claims against multiple credit card issuers in Hawaii state court.
- Defendants removed each case to federal court asserting CAFA jurisdiction and complete preemption under the National Bank Act.
- The federal court denied remand, holding removal proper based on complete preemption and that state-law claims are preempted.
- Attorney General moved for certification of interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and for stay pending appeal.
- Court considered whether interlocutory appeal presents controlling questions of law, substantial ground for difference of opinion, and would materially advance termination.
- Court granted the motion, concluding federal jurisdiction is a threshold issue and the appeal could resolve central legal questions affecting the case and related actions, justifying a stay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Remand Order involve a controlling question of law? | Louis argues the definitions of 'interest' under the National Bank Act are unsettled and impact jurisdiction. | Defendants contend the issue is fact-intensive and not a pure question of law, relying on settled definitions. | Yes; the issue is a controlling question of law. |
| Is there substantial ground for difference of opinion on the controlling question of law? | AG contends multiple legal questions lack settled consensus, including interpretation of 'interest' and preemption for non-usury claims. | Defendants argue the standard is settled and the Court merely disagrees with application to facts. | Yes; there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. |
| Will an interlocutory appeal materially advance termination of the litigation? | Certification would resolve threshold jurisdiction, potentially terminating the case if Ninth Circuit reverses remand. | Appeal would delay proceedings and is unlikely to quickly terminate all cases. | Yes; it would materially advance termination. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1982) (interlocutory review available when it would avoid protracted litigation)
- U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1966) (section 1292(b) to be used sparingly for controlling questions of law)
- Chehalem Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Coventry Health Care, Inc., 2010 WL 952273 (D. Or. 2010) (pure question of law requirement for 1292(b))
- Cross-County Bank v. Klussman, 2004 WL 966289 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (no preemption where no usury claim expressly alleged)
- Hunter v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank USA, 947 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (consideration of preemption with respect to lack of usury claim)
