2022 Ohio 1909
Ohio2022Background
- Relators (five individuals) sued the Ohio House of Representatives and 98 individual members seeking a writ of mandamus to enforce Article I, Section 21(A) of the Ohio Constitution (prohibiting compulsion to participate in a “health care system”).
- They alleged COVID-19 responses (masking, temperature checks, contact tracing, vaccinations, collection of medical data) violated Article I, Section 21 and sought an order compelling the House to “defend” and uphold that provision.
- Requested relief included (a) compelling the House to enact or block legislation to protect Article I, Section 21 and (b) ordering the Attorney General to halt any public or private entity allegedly violating the provision.
- The House respondents moved to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, concluding the requested writ would intrude on the legislature’s purely legislative functions under the separation-of-powers doctrine.
- Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but cautioned the majority conflated subject-matter jurisdiction with limits on the court’s remedial powers under separation of powers; he would not reach the unbriefed question whether separation of powers deprives the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mandamus can compel the House to "defend" or enact legislation to enforce Article I, §21 | Relators: House has a duty (via oath) to uphold the Constitution and must be compelled to protect §21 (enact or block laws). | House: Courts may not direct legislative bodies to perform purely legislative acts; separation of powers bars such relief. | Court: Writ will not issue to require performance of purely legislative duties; relief is beyond court's jurisdiction. |
| Whether court may preemptively prohibit the General Assembly from enacting conflicting legislation | Relators: Court should prevent future encroachments on §21 by directing the House. | House: Courts cannot enjoin the legislature from exercising its lawmaking power. | Court: Separation of powers precludes preemptive judicial orders restraining enactment of legislation. |
| Whether the court can order the House to compel the Attorney General to halt alleged violations | Relators: House should order AG to stop operations violating §21. | House: AG is independently elected; any control must come through legislation, not judicial direction to the legislature. | Court: Cannot order the legislature to compel the AG; such direction would improperly intrude on legislative and executive roles. |
| Whether separation-of-powers limits subject-matter jurisdiction for mandamus actions | Relators: Implicit that mandamus is available to enforce constitutional rights against state actors. | House: Separation-of-powers prevents the court from granting the requested relief, effectively barring the action. | Majority: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under separation-of-powers restraint. Kennedy concurrence: Agrees relief is unavailable but says separation-of-powers is not the same as subject-matter jurisdiction and the question should not be decided unbriefed. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections, 31 N.E.3d 596 (2014) (mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued only when the right is clear)
- State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 81 N.E.3d 1250 (2017) (elements required to obtain writ of mandamus)
- State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 716 N.E.2d 704 (1999) (courts will not compel legislative bodies to perform purely legislative duties)
- Wapakoneta v. Helpling, 19 N.E.2d 772 (1939) (relief denied where enforcement would intrude on discretionary legislative functions)
- Toledo v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1257 (2018) (separation-of-powers prevents judicial control over the legislature’s lawmaking prerogative)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (judicial role is to declare what the law is)