State ex rel. Jerry Cullen, Relator v. The Honorable Kevin Harrell, 567 S.W.3d 633

Background

Jerry Cullen (Husband) and Janice Scroggins (Wife) divorced; their 2009 dissolution judgment incorporated a Marital Settlement Agreement awarding Wife one-half of Husband’s military retirement benefits earned during the marriage and required the parties to execute documents necessary to effectuate the agreement.
Wife alleges DFAS told her the original formula was wrong for reservists and a 2014 clarification set a reservist-point-based formula and stated Husband earned 2,134 points during the marriage.
Wife attempted to obtain records from DFAS and Husband; after Husband refused, she filed a 2017 motion to compel Husband to provide correspondence and sign authorizations releasing military records relating to reservist points earned during the marriage.
The circuit court overruled Husband’s motion to dismiss (which argued Rule 74.06(c)’s one-year limit) and sustained Wife’s motion, ordering production of correspondence and an authorization limited to documents relating to reservist points earned during the marriage.
Husband sought writ of prohibition from the Missouri Supreme Court arguing the order (1) improperly modified the judgment and was time-barred under Rule 74.06, (2) was barred by res judicata/collateral estoppel, and (3) violated due process and HIPAA/privacy without a hearing.
The Missouri Supreme Court (en banc) quashed the preliminary writ, holding the circuit court acted within its inherent authority to enforce and effectuate its dissolution judgment and did not violate due process or HIPAA.

Issues

Issue	Cullen's Argument	Scroggins' Argument	Held
Whether the circuit court exceeded authority by compelling production of military correspondence and authorizations as a post-judgment modification	The order effectively modified the judgment and therefore was time-barred by Rule 74.06(c) and subject to res judicata/collateral estoppel	The motion only sought documents to effectuate the existing judgment (not to modify it); court has inherent power to order what is necessary to effectuate its decree	Court held order did not modify judgment; it enforced the judgment and fell within the court’s inherent power to effectuate its decree
Whether Wife’s motion was barred by Rule 74.06(c)’s one-year limitation for relief from judgment	Motion is a disguised Rule 74.06(b) attempt to modify judgment and so untimely	Motion sought enforcement/document production, not relief from the judgment, so Rule 74.06(c) inapplicable	Court held Rule 74.06 inapplicable because Wife did not seek relief or modification of the judgment
Whether due process required an evidentiary hearing before sustaining the motion to compel	Cullen argued lack of hearing denied due process	Scroggins argued no Rule 74.06(b) relief sought, so no special hearing requirement; Cullen had opportunity to respond	Court held no due-process violation: the motion was not a Rule 74.06(b) motion requiring an evidentiary hearing and Cullen had opportunity to respond
Whether the production/authorization order violated privacy/HIPAA by being overly broad	Cullen contended authorization forced release of HIPAA-protected records without compliance with federal safeguards	Scroggins pointed to the court’s limiting language restricting documents to those relating to reservist points during the marriage	Court held authorization was not overly broad; it was limited to records relating to reservist points earned during the marriage and did not violate HIPAA or due process

Key Cases Cited

Benton v. Alcazar Hotel Co., 194 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1946) (courts have inherent power to make orders necessary to effectuate decrees)
McLean v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 277 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (trial courts retain inherent power to enforce judgments though power to modify ceases once judgment is final)
State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870 (Mo. banc 2009) (standards for writ of prohibition)
State ex rel. Church & Dwight Co. v. Collins, 543 S.W.3d 22 (Mo. banc 2018) (extraordinary writ principles)
Eggers v. Enright, 609 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. banc 1980) (relator bears burden to show trial court acted in excess of authority)
Spicer v. Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Trust, 336 S.W.3d 466 (Mo. banc 2011) (finality of judgment limits trial court authority over case)
Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993) (after judgment becomes final the court’s ability to act is limited to statutory or rule-based exceptions)
Odom v. Langston, 213 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1948) (civil contempt is the ordinary method to enforce compliance with final judgments)
Kesterson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 712 (Mo. banc 2008) (res judicata principles apply to subsequent suits)
Woods v. Mehlville Chrysler-Plymouth, 198 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (collateral estoppel prerequisites and application)