State ex rel. Heart of America Council, Boy Scouts of America and Boy Scouts of America, Relators v. The Honorable Charles H. McKenzie
484 S.W.3d 320
| Mo. | 2016Background
- John Doe alleges Scoutmaster Bradshaw sexually abused him from 1992–1997 when Doe was 12–18; Doe always remembered the abuse and his parents reported it in 1997.
- Doe sued in April 2011 (shortly before his 31st birthday) against Bradshaw, the Heart of America Council, and the Boy Scouts of America asserting: (1) statutory childhood sexual abuse under §537.046, (2) vicarious/common‑law battery, and (3) direct negligence (negligent hiring/supervision).
- The Boy Scouts moved for summary judgment arguing: (a) battery and negligence claims are time‑barred by their respective statutes of limitations; and (b) §537.046 creates a cause of action only against the actual perpetrator, not non‑perpetrators like the Boy Scouts.
- The trial court denied the Boy Scouts’ summary judgment motions; the Boy Scouts sought a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Supreme Court to compel entry of summary judgment.
- The Missouri Supreme Court (en banc) granted a permanent writ: it held battery and negligence claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and that §537.046 does not create a cause of action against non‑perpetrators.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are common‑law battery and negligence claims timely? | Doe: tolling/fraudulent concealment or §537.046 should allow suit. | Boy Scouts: battery (2‑yr) and negligence (5‑yr) SOLs expired; no tolling facts. | Held: Time‑barred; SOLs expired and no fraudulent concealment shown. |
| Does §537.046’s extended limitations period apply to battery and negligence claims? | Doe: the 2004 amendment (10 yrs after age 21 or 3 yrs after discovery) should govern all claims arising from the abuse. | Boy Scouts: §537.046 applies only to actions "brought pursuant to this section," i.e., statutory childhood sexual abuse claims, not common‑law torts. | Held: §537.046 does not extend SOLs for battery or negligence. |
| Does §537.046 create a cause of action against non‑perpetrators (e.g., organizations) via vicarious liability, aiding/abetting, or negligent hiring/supervision? | Doe: statute’s language "any action to recover damages from injury or illness caused by childhood sexual abuse" does not expressly exclude non‑perpetrators. | Boy Scouts: statute defines "childhood sexual abuse" as acts "committed by the defendant against the plaintiff," requiring the defendant to have committed the act. | Held: §537.046 permits suit only against the actual perpetrator; it does not authorize causes of action against non‑perpetrators. |
| Did the Boy Scouts’ conduct fraudulently conceal the claim and toll SOLs under §516.280? | Doe: Boy Scouts told family they would "take care of" the situation and concealed other incidents, so tolling applies. | Boy Scouts: Doe always knew of the abuse, consulted counsel, and no affirmative concealment that prevented suit was shown. | Held: No fraudulent concealment; tolling inapplicable. |
Key Cases Cited
- ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid‑Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. banc 1993) (summary judgment standard is de novo)
- State ex rel. City of Blue Springs v. Nixon, 250 S.W.3d 365 (Mo. banc 2008) (writ of prohibition appropriate to prevent unnecessary litigation)
- State ex rel. Bloomquist v. Schneider, 244 S.W.3d 139 (Mo. banc 2008) (writ may prevent trial of time‑barred claims)
- Marianist Province v. Ross, 258 S.W.3d 809 (Mo. banc 2008) (when limitations begin to run; discovery/ascentainability principles)
- Batek v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 920 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. banc 1996) (elements of fraudulent concealment tolling)
- Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198 (8th Cir. 2011) (a non‑perpetrator cannot be liable under a statutory definition that requires the defendant to have committed the abusive act)
- State v. Rowe, 63 S.W.3d 647 (Mo. banc 2002) (courts cannot rewrite statutes; apply plain meaning)
- Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City, 862 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. banc 1993) (constitutional limits on retroactive revival of barred causes of action)