State ex rel. Graham v. Pittman
2021 Ohio 665
Ohio Ct. App.2021Background
- Relator Damantae Graham sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Laurie Pittman from conducting a resentencing hearing scheduled for March 8, 2021, after the Ohio Supreme Court vacated his death sentence and remanded for resentencing.
- Graham filed an application for reopening his direct appeal in the Supreme Court of Ohio and argued that the pendency of that application divested the trial court of jurisdiction.
- Graham analogized his reopening application to (a) a notice of appeal or (b) an App.R. 26(B) application in the court of appeals, both of which can affect trial-court jurisdiction.
- The respondent (Judge Pittman) moved to dismiss Graham’s prohibition complaint. The court reviewed the elements for a writ of prohibition and the adequacy-of-remedy requirement.
- The court concluded Graham failed to show a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction because the mere filing of an application for reopening in the Ohio Supreme Court does not automatically divest the trial court of jurisdiction; the Supreme Court’s rule indicates only that, if the Supreme Court grants reopening, it may impose conditions to preserve the status quo.
- The Court of Appeals granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss; Graham’s remedy by direct appeal bars issuance of the writ absent a clear jurisdictional defect.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a writ of prohibition should issue to stop the trial court’s resentencing because of a pending application for reopening in the Ohio Supreme Court | Graham: Filing the reopening application divests the trial court of jurisdiction (analogous to an appeal or App.R.26(B) reopening) | Pittman: Trial court retains jurisdiction unless a patent/unambiguous defect exists; appeal/reopening remedy exists | Denied — no patent/unambiguous jurisdictional defect; writ inappropriate; dismissal granted |
| Whether the mere filing of an application for reopening in the Ohio Supreme Court is the functional equivalent of an appeal that stays trial-court proceedings | Graham: Filing alone should be treated like an appeal and deprive the trial court of authority | Pittman: Supreme Court rules show only that if the Court grants reopening it may preserve the status quo; filing alone does not automatically divest jurisdiction | Held that filing alone does not clearly deprive the trial court of jurisdiction; the issue is not patent and unambiguous |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Florence v. Zitter, 106 Ohio St.3d 87, 831 N.E.2d 1003 (2005) (sets elements for writ of prohibition and explains limited, extraordinary nature of the writ)
- State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 886 N.E.2d 201 (2008) (addresses standards for writs and adequacy of alternative remedies)
- Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998) (defines writ of prohibition as enjoining inferior courts from exceeding inherent authority)
- Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334, 767 N.E.2d 725 (2002) (holds that a direct appeal can be an adequate legal remedy barring a prohibition claim)
- State ex rel. Godale v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 166 Ohio App.3d 851, 853 N.E.2d 708 (2006) (explains that only patent and unambiguous jurisdictional defects justify bypassing the ordinary appellate remedy)