State ex rel. Fite v. Johnson
530 S.W.3d 508
| Mo. | 2017Background
- In 2013 Ledford pleaded guilty to stealing property valued > $500 and < $25,000 and was sentenced as a felon to five years (suspended) with five years probation under § 570.030.3(1).
- In November 2015 the court revoked probation, executed the sentence, and Ledford was delivered to DOC; no appeal or Rule 24.035 post‑conviction motion was filed within the Rule 24.035 time limits.
- In February 2017, after the Rule 24.035 filing period had expired, Ledford filed a Rule 29.07(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing State v. Bazell held the offense is a misdemeanor and Bazell should apply retroactively.
- The circuit court granted the Rule 29.07(d) motion, amended the information to a class A misdemeanor, and resentenced Ledford to one year (with credit for time served).
- The State sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court, arguing the circuit court lacked authority to grant the post‑sentence relief and that Bazell was not retroactive to final judgments not on direct appeal.
- The Supreme Court held Ledford’s claim was procedurally defaulted under Rule 24.035, substantively meritless as Bazell is not retroactive to final convictions, and the circuit court lacked authority to grant relief under Rule 29.07(d); the preliminary writ was made permanent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the circuit court had authority to grant Ledford’s post‑sentence Rule 29.07(d) motion after judgment and sentencing | Ledford: Rule 29.07(d) permits setting aside a judgment after sentence to correct manifest injustice | State: Claims attacking a final judgment after a guilty plea must proceed under Rule 24.035; Rule 29.07(d) does not provide an independent remedy for claims covered by Rule 24.035 | Circuit court lacked authority; Rule 24.035 is the exclusive post‑conviction procedure for claims of sentence exceeding authorized maximum, so Rule 29.07(d) did not apply |
| Whether Ledford’s claim was procedurally barred for failing to file a timely Rule 24.035 motion | Ledford: Bazell changed the law such that his sentence was unlawful, entitling him to relief under Rule 29.07(d) | State: Because Ledford pleaded guilty and did not file Rule 24.035 within the statutory period after delivery to DOC, his claim is procedurally defaulted | Held procedurally defaulted; Rule 24.035 was the exclusive remedy and Ledford failed to timely invoke it |
| Whether Bazell’s interpretation of § 570.030.3(1) applies retroactively to final convictions not on direct appeal | Ledford: Bazell should apply retroactively, making his felony conviction a misdemeanor | State: Bazell is prospective only except for cases pending on direct appeal; does not apply to final judgments | Held Bazell is not retroactive to final convictions; Ledford’s claim is substantively meritless |
| Whether the felony enhancement in § 570.030.3(1) properly applies to § 570.030.1 stealing | Ledford: The value-based enhancement made his offense a felony | State: Bazell held value is not an element of the base offense and the enhancement does not apply to § 570.030.1 as pleaded | Court agreed with Bazell on statutory interpretation but concluded the decision applies prospectively only; thus Ledford’s conviction remains a felony for his final judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bazell, 497 S.W.3d 263 (Mo. banc 2016) (interpreting § 570.030 and holding value is not an element of the base stealing offense)
- Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. banc 2002) (Rule 24.035 is the exclusive collateral procedure for certain post‑conviction claims; Rule 29.07(d) does not supplant Rule 24.035)
- State v. Larson, 79 S.W.3d 891 (Mo. banc 2002) (criminal judgment becomes final when sentence is entered)
- State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993) (after judgment and sentencing, trial court generally exhausted jurisdiction except as provided by statute or rule)
- State ex rel. Strauser v. Martinez, 416 S.W.3d 798 (Mo. banc 2014) (standards for issuance of writs of prohibition)
- State v. Passley, 389 S.W.3d 180 (Mo. App. 2012) (prior appellate decision treating value threshold as felony enhancement; disapproved by Bazell)
- State v. Smith, 522 S.W.3d 221 (Mo. banc 2017) (post‑Bazell authority discussing scope and application of Bazell)
- State ex rel. Windeknecht v. Mesmer, 530 S.W.3d 500 (Mo. banc 2017) (holding Bazell’s interpretation applies prospectively only except for cases pending on direct appeal)