2020 Ohio 3080
Ohio2020Background
- Ohio law (R.C. 323.65–323.79) authorizes county boards of revision (BORs) to adjudicate certain tax-foreclosure proceedings and to transfer tax-delinquent abandoned property directly to land banks as an alternative to judicial foreclosure.
- In June 2017 the Cuyahoga County BOR entered a judgment foreclosing relator Elliott G. Feltner’s property and transferred the deed to the Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation (Land Bank); the Land Bank later conveyed the property to a third party.
- More than a year later Feltner filed an original-action petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus, arguing the BOR lacked authority because the statutory scheme violates separation-of-powers and due-process guarantees (conflict of interest and lack of impartiality/notice).
- The Supreme Court previously narrowed issues and granted an alternative writ on two claims against the BOR and its members; the case returned for final determination whether the BOR patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction.
- The court framed the threshold for corrective prohibition: to undo a final judgment the relator must show the tribunal patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction (i.e., statute authorizing action was clearly unconstitutional under then-existing precedent).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether BOR patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to foreclose under R.C. 323.65–.79 | Feltner: statutes are unconstitutional (separation of powers; due process/conflict of interest) so BOR lacked jurisdiction | Respondents: BOR had clear statutory authority; statutes presumptively constitutional; no controlling precedent declaring them unconstitutional | Denied—BOR did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction; court need not resolve constitutional merits |
| Whether a court may correctively undo a final judgment based on a constitutional attack on authorizing statute | Feltner: constitutional attack can justify corrective writ to undo final adjudication | Respondents: corrective writ applies only where lack of jurisdiction is obvious under then-existing law; statutes presumed valid | Court: for corrective prohibition, relator must show authorizing statute was clearly unconstitutional under precedent existing when tribunal acted |
| Separation-of-powers: does statutory scheme unconstitutionally usurp judicial power? | Feltner: adjudicating foreclosures and ordering direct transfers is strictly judicial and cannot be delegated to BOR | Respondents: availability of transfer to court and de novo judicial review prevents unlawful consolidation of powers | Majority avoided deciding constitutional question; concurring opinions rejected the separation‑of‑powers claim (appeal/de novo review and historical practice support BOR authority) |
| Due process / conflict of interest from local charter and overlapping roles | Feltner: county treasurer, county executive, BOR members, and Land Bank interests overlap, creating bias and denying fair process and notice | Respondents: any procedural or conflict concerns did not show BOR patently lacked jurisdiction; statutory remedies exist (transfer to court, appeals) | Court: not a patent and unambiguous jurisdictional defect; concurrence acknowledged appearance concerns but held claim was procedurally late and remediable |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326 (1972) (corrective writ may issue for total want of jurisdiction)
- State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76 (2008) (statute presumed constitutional; limits on using prohibition to decide constitutional challenges)
- Nolan v. ClenDening, 93 Ohio St. 264 (1915) (writ of prohibition designed to police ultra vires jurisdiction)
- Stanton v. State Tax Commission, 114 Ohio St. 658 (1926) (availability of judicial review/appeal prevents unconstitutional consolidation of powers)
- Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner, 95 Ohio St. 232 (1917) (General Assembly may not confer strictly and conclusively judicial powers on nonjudicial bodies)
- Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856) (historical practice: tax collection and related remedies often handled administratively)
- Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (summary/administrative tax proceedings have historical legitimacy and do not necessarily violate due process)