60 Cal. 4th 1002
Cal.2015Background
- California’s Freeway Service Patrol (FSP) provides free emergency roadside assistance; Caltrans manages funding, CHP provides training/supervision, and local agencies contract privately-owned tow companies to supply drivers and trucks.
- OCTA contracted with California Coach (tow provider) and with CHP for supervision; on Jan. 16, 2008 a California Coach FSP tow truck driven by Joshua Guzman struck Mayra Alvarado and her child, causing injuries.
- Alvarado sued Guzman, California Coach, CHP, Caltrans, and OCTA; parties stipulated CHP’s sole theory of liability for purposes of CHP’s summary judgment motion was that CHP was Guzman’s “special employer.”
- Trial court denied CHP summary judgment and certified the legal question whether the FSP statutory scheme is inconsistent with CHP being a special employer; Court of Appeal held CHP cannot be a special employer as a matter of law and entered summary judgment for CHP.
- The California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the FSP statutes preclude finding CHP a special employer and whether that preclusion is categorical.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CHP is a "special employer" of FSP tow drivers under common law respondeat superior | Alvarado: CHP effectively controls drivers (training, supervision, dispatch) and thus is a special employer | CHP: statutory scheme treats private tow providers as employers; CHP’s duties are supervisory/public-safety, not employment control | The FSP statutes are inconsistent with treating CHP as a special employer as a matter of statutory scheme, but that does not categorically preclude CHP from becoming a special employer under particular factual/contractual arrangements |
| Whether Vehicle/Streets & Highways Code definitions of “employer” preclude CHP liability as special employer | Alvarado: statutory "employer" definitions do not displace common-law special employer inquiry | CHP: statutes define "employer" to refer to tow service providers and allocate duties accordingly, indicating Legislature did not intend CHP to be an employer | Court: statutory definitions and scheme show legislature treated tow providers as employers and distinguished CHP; this undercuts (but does not absolutely foreclose) special-employer status for CHP |
| Whether CHP’s operational roles (training, background checks, dispatch, field direction) amount to the requisite right of control | Alvarado: CHP’s training, dispatch and on-scene direction evidence control over drivers | CHP: such functions are regulatory/supervisory and police powers, not employer control | Court: the primary right-to-control factor weighs against special employment because CHP’s authority derives from public-safety/police functions and program oversight rather than employer control |
| Whether Court of Appeal correctly entered categorical summary judgment for CHP | Alvarado: factual record may show CHP undertook greater control here, so case-specific inquiry needed | CHP: statutes show CHP cannot be special employer as matter of law | Court: Court of Appeal erred — statutes render special-employer status unlikely as a default, but CHP may contractually assume greater control and thus could be a special employer under particular facts; remand for factual determination |
Key Cases Cited
- Marsh v. Tilley Steel Co., 26 Cal.3d 486 (discusses special employer/borrowed servant doctrine and right-of-control focus)
- Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist., 19 Cal.4th 925 (Government Claims Act governs public entity tort liability absent statutory basis)
- Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal.3d 168 (special employer and consequences for workers’ compensation exclusivity)
- Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal.4th 522 (adoption of Restatement factors beyond right-of-control in employment analysis)
- Curle v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.4th 1057 (statutory definitions bind courts when provided)
- Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54 (rationale for respondeat superior and risk spreading through employer insurance)
- Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal.3d 956 (employer liability principles in tort context)
- Societa per Azioni de Navigazione Italia v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal.3d 446 (special/dual employment analysis in public-employee context)
- Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 491 (analysis of employment status where statute does not define "employee")