State ex rel. Davis v. Janas (Slip Opinion), 155 N.E.3d 822

In 1994 Davis was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to life with parole eligibility after 20 years (no aggravating circumstances). The court of appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence.
In 1999 the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc entry stating Davis was sentenced to life with parole eligibility after 20 full years.
Davis learned of the 1999 entry in 2018 from the Adult Parole Authority and requested a copy from the clerk.
In April 2019 Davis filed for a writ of mandamus seeking vacation of the 1999 nunc pro tunc entry and reinstatement of the original sentence (parole eligibility after 20 years).
The trial judge moved to dismiss, arguing the entry only clarified the sentence under Crim.R. 36, that Davis had an adequate remedy by appeal, and that the issue was moot because Davis became parole-eligible. The court of appeals dismissed Davis’s complaint.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding the mandamus complaint sufficiently alleged the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to change the sentence after affirmance on appeal, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Davis)	Defendant's Argument (Janas)	Held
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a nunc pro tunc entry changing Davis's sentence after the sentence was affirmed on appeal	Trial court lacked jurisdiction to alter a final sentence after affirmance; nunc pro tunc cannot make substantive change	The 1999 entry merely clarified/corrected the original sentence under Crim.R. 36	Court: Trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to change the sentence after affirmance
Whether a nunc pro tunc entry may convert "parole eligibility after 20 years" into "parole eligibility after 20 full years"	That conversion is substantive and impermissible via nunc pro tunc	The entry was clerical clarification, not a substantive change	Court: Nunc pro tunc cannot be used to make substantive changes; limited to reflecting what court actually decided
Whether mandamus was barred by existence of an adequate remedy or mootness (parole eligibility)	Mandamus appropriate because jurisdictional defect; not moot because Davis remains entitled to correct credits/reductions	Adequate remedy existed by appeal; issue moot because Davis is parole-eligible now	Court: Adequate-remedy rule does not apply when lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous; case not moot — Davis still serving sentence and entitled to proper credits

State ex rel. Marsh v. Tibbals, 77 N.E.3d 909 (Ohio 2017) (elements for mandamus and requirement to prove entitlement by clear and convincing evidence)
State ex rel. O'Grady v. Griffing, 17 N.E.3d 574 (Ohio 2014) (burden of proof for mandamus)
State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 678 N.E.2d 549 (Ohio 1997) (mandamus typically not available when adequate remedy exists unless jurisdictional defect is patent and unambiguous)
State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 779 N.E.2d 223 (Ohio 2002) (trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify final sentence via nunc pro tunc; mandamus appropriate)
State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 656 N.E.2d 1288 (Ohio 1995) (nunc pro tunc entries limited to reflecting what court actually decided)
Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 378 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio 1978) (trial court generally loses jurisdiction to modify judgment after affirmance on appeal)
State v. Miller, 940 N.E.2d 924 (Ohio 2010) (Crim.R.36 and definition/limits of clerical error)