State ex rel. Cromwell v. Dellick
2017 Ohio 7564
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Eric and Jennifer Cromwell (Relators) sought conversion of their trial-court temporary custody order into legal custody for two minor children by filing a motion on February 8, 2017.
- The trial court (Judge Theresa Dellick) had previously adjudicated the children abused and dependent and transferred temporary custody (2013–2014) among family members; the matter involves multiple related custody arrangements and ongoing visitation orders.
- Relators filed a mandamus petition in this court on March 15, 2017, asking the trial judge to rule on their pending motion; they later filed a procedendo complaint in May 2017 seeking the same relief.
- The Rules of Superintendence (Sup.R. 40(A)(3)) provide motions should be ruled on within 120 days, but the Ohio Supreme Court has held that rule does not itself create a mandamus right; it is a guide to evaluate undue delay.
- When Relators filed the mandamus petition, only 35 days had elapsed since their motion—premature under the 120-day guideline; by the time of decision, 120 days had passed but the trial court had scheduling and complexity-based reasons for delay and had set a custody trial (rescheduled to October 16, 2017).
- The appellate court found no undue delay attributable to the trial judge and dismissed Relators’ mandamus petition; costs taxed to Relators.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether relators are entitled to mandamus to compel the trial judge to rule on a pending motion | Cromwell: Judge Dellick must act on their legal-custody motion now | Dellick: Petition is premature and/or no undue delay; Sup.R. 40 does not create an enforceable right to mandamus | Dismissed: Petition was premature when filed; later delay justified by case complexity and scheduling; no undue delay attributable to judge |
| Whether Sup.R. 40(A)(3) creates a direct right to mandamus relief | Cromwell: 120-day rule supports compel to rule | Dellick: Sup.R. 40 does not create an enforceable right; it only guides whether delay is undue | Court: Sup.R. 40 doesn’t itself create a right to mandamus but informs whether delay is undue; relief not automatic after 120 days |
| Whether filing in this court caused or contributed to any delay | Cromwell: (implicit) asked this court to compel ruling | Dellick: Relators’ filing in the appellate court contributed to delay and premature relief request | Court: Relators filed prematurely; appellate filing contributed to scheduling complications; trial court’s timeline not the cause of undue delay |
| Whether other factors (complexity, scheduling, related proceedings) justified exceeding 120 days | Cromwell: (implicit) ruling should issue despite complexity | Dellick: Complexity, multiple parties, related custody/visitation arrangements and scheduling conflicts justify more time | Court: These factors justified additional time; no extraordinary writ warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections, 142 Ohio St.3d 370 (2014) (mandamus is extraordinary and granted only when right is clear)
- State ex rel. Taxpayers for Westerville Schools v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 133 Ohio St.3d 153 (2012) (elements required for mandamus relief)
- State ex rel. Culgan v. Collier, 135 Ohio St.3d 436 (2013) (Sup.R. 40(A)(3) does not create an enforceable right but guides analysis of undue delay)