State ex rel. Brown v. Luebbers
137 Ohio St. 3d 542
| Ohio | 2013Background
- Barron Brown was convicted in 2004 of heroin possession, trafficking (with specifications), and conspiracy; the conspiracy conviction was later reversed on appeal.
- After multiple appeals and remands about postrelease-control notification, Brown was resentenced; the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry on February 13, 2012 correcting an earlier sentencing error (removing a mistaken merger notation regarding the reversed conspiracy count).
- Brown moved to vacate that nunc pro tunc entry as void; Judge Jody Luebbers has not ruled on that motion or other post-judgment filings.
- Brown filed a complaint for a writ of procedendo in the First District Court of Appeals to compel Judge Luebbers to rule; the court of appeals dismissed the complaint without substantial analysis.
- The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal and held that because the trial court has general subject-matter jurisdiction and has unduly delayed ruling, procedendo is appropriate to compel a ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brown is entitled to a writ of procedendo to compel the trial judge to rule on his motion to vacate the nunc pro tunc entry (and other motions) | Brown: Judge Luebbers has not ruled and has unduly delayed; procedendo is warranted | Luebbers: After correcting the sentencing entry, she was divested of jurisdiction and thus need not rule | Court: Luebbers has general subject-matter jurisdiction and may rule (including dismissing for lack of jurisdiction); her failure to rule is undue delay—writ granted |
| Whether a trial court that lacks appellate jurisdiction may still act by ruling that it lacks jurisdiction | Brown: Trial court can and should rule on motions rather than ignore them | Luebbers: Once appellate remand resolved, further filings are beyond her jurisdiction | Court: Absent a patent, unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court with general jurisdiction may decide its own jurisdiction and must rule on motions |
| Whether Sup.R. 40(A)(3)’s 120‑day duty to rule creates an enforceable remedy | Brown: The rule supports relief when courts unreasonably delay | Luebbers: (implicit) Rule does not create an independent private right to enforcement | Court: Although Sup.R. 40 is not directly privately enforceable, procedendo/mandamus lie where a court refuses or unduly delays rendering judgment; delay here supports relief |
| Whether dismissal by the court of appeals was correct | Brown: Dismissal was erroneous because he showed right to procedendo | Luebbers: Court of appeals found no clear legal right to procedendo | Court: Reversed the dismissal and granted the writ |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 72 Ohio St.3d 461 (procedendo standards)
- State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna, 73 Ohio St.3d 180 (procedendo for refusal or undue delay)
- State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 134 Ohio St.3d 421 (a court with general jurisdiction may determine its own jurisdiction)
- State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264 (same principle on jurisdiction self-determination)
- State ex rel. Pruitt v. Donnelly, 129 Ohio St.3d 498 (jurisdictional determination by trial court)
- State ex rel. Culgan v. Collier, 135 Ohio St.3d 436 (Sup.R. 40 duty to rule; procedendo relief for undue delay)
- State ex rel. Reynolds v. Basinger, 99 Ohio St.3d 303 (procedendo/mandamus available when a court refuses or unduly delays)
- State ex rel. Weiss v. Hoover, 84 Ohio St.3d 530 (procedendo appropriate for unreasonable delay)