2023 Ohio 3871
Ohio Ct. App.2023Background
- Fouad Inc. owns a residence in Olmsted Township near Cleveland Hopkins International Airport; runways were expanded in stages (2002–2008), after which relators alleged increased low-altitude flights, noise, vibration, and property damage.
- Relators filed administrative challenges with the FAA and federal suits; the FAA and the Sixth Circuit rejected their claim that the property lay within the Airport’s statutory "landing area."
- Relators sought a writ of mandamus in state court compelling the City of Cleveland to commence eminent-domain (appropriation) proceedings, alleging a physical taking of airspace over their property.
- Cleveland moved for summary judgment arguing relators lacked standing and the claim was not redressable because Cleveland lacked authority to appropriate property outside its municipal limits absent statutory authorization.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Cleveland, concluding relators’ claim was not redressable under the Ohio Constitution or R.C. 719.01/719.02; the court relied on Clifton and Moore.
- This appellate court affirmed: Cleveland lacked constitutional eminent-domain power outside its limits and the statutory definitions cited by relators did not encompass airspace over property outside the airport’s land or water.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Ohio Constitution (Section 19, Art. I) authorizes Cleveland to appropriate property outside its boundaries for an alleged physical taking by aircraft | Boggs: Frequent, low flights amount to a physical taking; Ohio Constitution entitles relators to mandamus to compel appropriation | Cleveland: Municipal eminent-domain power is limited by Article XVIII; no inherent power to appropriate outside limits absent statute | Court: No — municipal eminent-domain power does not extend beyond corporate limits absent legislative authorization; constitutional claim fails |
| Whether R.C. 719.01(O)/719.02 (definitions borrowed from R.C. 4561.01) authorize Cleveland to appropriate the relators’ property as part of an "airport" or "landing field" | Boggs: Property falls within the airport/landing-field definitions (including approach/clear/horizontal surfaces) and R.C. 719.02 therefore permits appropriation | Cleveland: Statutory definitions in R.C. 4561.01 apply to "location on land or water" (not airspace); relators claim concerns airspace, not land needed for airport purposes | Court: No — the plain statutory definitions cover land or water locations used for landing/takeoff; relators assert invasion of airspace only, so statutory authority to appropriate the land outside airport limits is lacking; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Clifton v. Blanchester, 964 N.E.2d 414 (Ohio 2012) (municipality cannot be compelled to appropriate property outside its limits for regulatory-taking claims absent statutory authority)
- Moore v. Middletown, 975 N.E.2d 977 (Ohio 2012) (property owners lack standing to force a municipality to appropriate property outside its jurisdiction for regulatory-taking complaints)
- Britt v. Columbus, 309 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio 1974) (municipal eminent-domain power under local self-government does not extend beyond municipal limits absent statute)
- United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (U.S. 1946) (low, frequent flights can constitute a compensable taking when they directly and immediately interfere with land use)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing requires injury, causation, and redressability)
- Shemo v. Mayfield Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345 (Ohio 2002) (mandamus is proper to compel a public authority to institute appropriation where an involuntary taking is alleged)
- Boggs v. FAA, [citation="764 F. App'x 480"] (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming FAA’s determination that the property was not within the statutory "landing area")