State Department of State Hospitals v. Superior Court
61 Cal. 4th 339
| Cal. | 2015Background
- In 2007 Gilton Pitre, previously convicted of a 1996 rape, was referred by the Department of Corrections (DOC) to the State Department of Mental Health (DMH) as a possible Sexually Violent Predator (SVP); DMH conducted only a single-record review rather than the two-evaluator "full evaluation" required by the SVPA, and did not request a commitment petition.
- Four days after parole, Pitre raped and murdered Alyssa Gomez; plaintiff (Gomez’s sister) sued DMH and two directors claiming breach of mandatory duties under Gov. Code §815.6 and negligence, and sought a writ to compel proper SVPA evaluations.
- The superior court overruled a demurrer; on writ/demurrer review the Court of Appeal held the SVPA imposes a mandatory duty to use two evaluators but concluded proximate causation was lacking and directed the demurrer to be sustained as to the tort claims; the writ claim could proceed.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: it held DMH had a mandatory statutory duty to designate two evaluators for a full SVPA evaluation, but plaintiff’s complaint failed as a matter of law to plead proximate cause connecting that breach to Gomez’s death.
- The court explained the proximate-cause failure as (1) factual/speculative — the causal chain required multiple subsequent discretionary decisions (second evaluator disagreeing with first, two independents concurring if needed, designated counsel filing a petition, court probable-cause determination, and a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt) — and (2) policy concerns about extending liability through a chain of discretionary determinations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SVPA imposed a mandatory duty on DMH to use two evaluators | SVPA requires DMH to designate two evaluators; DMH breached that mandatory duty by using a single reviewer | DMH conceded duty to designate two for full evaluation but argued the overall process is discretionary so no mandatory-duty liability | Held: SVPA’s language is mandatory as to using two evaluators; complaint adequately alleges breach of that mandatory duty |
| Whether DMH had a mandatory duty to conduct in-person evaluations of referred inmates | Plaintiff argued DMH must perform in-person clinical evaluations | DMH argued SVPA leaves evaluation protocol details to its discretion | Held: No mandatory statutory requirement for in-person examinations; that aspect is discretionary |
| Whether breach of the mandatory duty was proximate cause of Gomez’s death under Gov. Code §815.6 | Plaintiff: but-for DMH’s failure to provide two evaluators, Pitre would have been committed and the murder prevented | DMH: Even if DMH breached, numerous discretionary steps (evaluators, counsel filing, court determinations, jury) break the causal chain; proximate cause not established | Held: Plaintiff’s complaint fails as a matter of law to plead proximate cause — speculative factual chain and policy limits preclude liability |
| Whether sovereign/immunity defenses bar suit | Plaintiff relied on Gov. Code §815.6 waiver for mandatory duties; sought tort relief and writ | DMH asserted immunities (e.g., Gov. Code §845.8 re parole/release decisions) | Held: Court did not resolve whether §845.8 applied to DMH’s failure to appoint two evaluators because proximate-cause failure was dispositive; plaintiff may pursue writ to compel compliance |
Key Cases Cited
- Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211 (1961) (abolished broad rule of governmental immunity and framed modern governmental liability context)
- Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.4th 490 (2000) (explains when statutory language creates a mandatory, non-discretionary duty)
- Guzman v. County of Monterey, 46 Cal.4th 887 (2009) (mandatory duty requires explicit, forceful statutory command and implementing guidelines)
- Creason v. Department of Health Services, 18 Cal.4th 623 (1998) (distinguishes mandatory statutory duties from discretionary implementation where liability may not follow)
- Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, 73 Cal.App.3d 698 (1977) (governmental failure to act was not proximate cause where subsequent discretionary judicial decisions broke causal chain)
- State of California v. Superior Court (Perry), 150 Cal.App.3d 848 (1984) (mandatory investigative duty did not establish proximate cause where many discretionary enforcement steps intervened)
- Fleming v. State of California, 34 Cal.App.4th 1378 (1995) (failure to arrest/parole violation not proximate cause of later crime because intervening discretionary processes would determine confinement)
- Viner v. Sweet, 30 Cal.4th 1232 (2003) (but-for causation and substantial-factor principles; governs factual causation analysis)
- Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., 21 Cal.4th 71 (1999) (pleading causation with particularity where causation is not self-evident)
- Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal.3d 399 (1976) (examples of cases where causation through governmental action was found; cited by plaintiff but distinguished)