41 Cal.App.5th 203
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- Neighboring parcels in Brentwood: Starview owns 816 Glenmere; Lees own 815 Glenmere. A 1958 easement (modified 1959) grants Starview driveway use over Lees’ land.
- Starview sought a City permit in 2017 that required a Covenant and Agreement for Community Driveway also signed by the Lees; the Lees refused and allegedly demanded extra consideration and indemnity.
- Starview sued (Apr. 2017) asserting breach of contract, specific performance, and injunctive relief based on the Lees’ refusal to sign; no anti-SLAPP motion was filed then.
- Over a year later Starview filed a first amended complaint (May 2018) adding claims: breach of implied covenant of good faith, negligent and intentional interference with easement, and private nuisance (based on the refusal and pre-litigation communications).
- The Lees filed an anti-SLAPP motion 55 days after the FAC, challenging the newly added causes of action and certain pre-litigation communications; the trial court denied the motion as untimely because the alleged protected conduct appeared in the original complaint.
- The Court of Appeal reversed, holding an anti-SLAPP motion to strike newly pleaded causes of action in an amended complaint is timely if those claims could not have been targeted earlier; remanded for the trial court to address merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether anti-SLAPP motion to FAC was timely under §425.16(f) | Starview: motion untimely because FAC’s challenged conduct was alleged in the original complaint, so 60-day window had passed | Lees: motion timely because FAC added new causes of action that could not have been targeted earlier | Timely: anti-SLAPP motion to strike newly asserted claims in FAC is timely if those claims didn’t exist in the original complaint (reversed trial court) |
| Whether anti-SLAPP targets allegations or causes of action | Starview: focus on the underlying conduct, not labels; prior pleadings contained same protected activity | Lees: statute targets causes of action based on protected activity; can’t strike what wasn’t pleaded | Court: statute targets causes of action (claims); protected conduct alone in earlier complaint doesn’t bar timely motion to new claims in FAC |
| Whether appellate court should decide merits and evidentiary objections | Starview: oppose motion on merits; Lees: ask court to decide merits now | Lees asked appellate resolution; Starview opposed | Court declined to decide merits on appeal; remanded for trial court to consider evidentiary and substantive issues in first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (2016) (anti-SLAPP applies to causes of action based on protected activity; context allegations alone cannot be struck)
- Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, 4 Cal.5th 637 (2018) (anti-SLAPP motion to amended complaint is permitted if new claims could not have been targeted earlier)
- Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson, 6 Cal.5th 610 (2019) (summary of anti-SLAPP two-step framework)
- Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (2017) (a claim "arises from" protected activity when that activity forms the basis for the claim)
- Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., 13 Cal.App.5th 757 (2017) (look to conduct underlying claims, not merely labels, when resolving anti-SLAPP motion)
- Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp., 239 Cal.App.4th 1174 (2015) (discusses court discretion to allow late anti-SLAPP motions and the statute's stay implications)