752 S.E.2d 812
Va.2014Background
- Starrs was indicted on two counts of felony possession with intent to distribute and entered guilty pleas pursuant to plea agreements reserving the right to seek a Hernandez-type disposition (deferment and possible dismissal).
- The circuit court issued a written order stating it accepted and entered Starrs’ guilty pleas, found evidence sufficient to convict, but (in the order) withheld a finding of guilt pending sentencing to allow Starrs to argue for a deferred disposition.
- At sentencing Starrs asked the court to defer disposition, release him on terms, and later dismiss the charges if conditions were met; the court denied the request, concluding that because the pleas had been accepted and entered the court lacked authority to dismiss.
- The circuit court then entered an order adjudicating Starrs guilty and imposed suspended five-year concurrent sentences; Starrs appealed.
- The Court of Appeals held that once a court accepts and enters a guilty plea on the record that act constitutes a conviction and the court no longer has discretion to dismiss the charges.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia granted review to decide whether a trial court retains inherent authority to withhold a finding of guilt and defer disposition after accepting and entering a defendant’s guilty plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court retains inherent authority to withhold adjudication and defer disposition after accepting and entering a guilty plea | Starrs: even after acceptance/entry, the court has inherent power until it issues a written adjudication to take matter under advisement and consider dismissal | Commonwealth: acceptance and entry of a plea is the functional equivalent of a conviction; once entered the court must impose legislatively prescribed punishment | Court held: Acceptance and entry of a guilty plea in a written order is not a formal adjudication of guilt; the court retained inherent authority to withhold finding of guilt and defer disposition until it enters a judgment adjudicating guilt |
| Whether acceptance/entry of a plea precludes later judicial dismissal without the Commonwealth's consent | Starrs: court can defer and later dismiss without legislative interference until judgment is entered | Commonwealth: permitting dismissal post-acceptance would undermine plea finality and statutory punishment scheme | Held: Court recognized inherent authority to defer and consider alternative dispositions pre-judgment but cautioned separation-of-powers limits: once judgment entered, court must follow legislature's prescribed punishment |
Key Cases Cited
- Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222, 707 S.E.2d 273 (2011) (trial court may take matter under advisement or continue case before a written guilty adjudication)
- Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127, 661 S.E.2d 841 (2008) (inherent authority to continue case for disposition after finding evidence sufficient to convict)
- In re Commonwealth's Attorney, 265 Va. 313, 576 S.E.2d 458 (2003) (mandamus will not compel a court to enter a judgment of guilt because that would prescribe judicial exercise of discretion)
- Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 222 S.E.2d 790 (1976) (a guilty plea supplies the proof and ordinarily obviates need for evidence; plea is equivalent to a conviction for many purposes)
- Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 906, 15 S.E.2d 76 (1941) (a guilty plea admits the criminating facts alleged and supplies the necessary proof)
- Jewel v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 430, 536 S.E.2d 905 (2000) (for certain statutory purposes, an accepted guilty plea may constitute a conviction; court limits applicability)
- Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) (a plea of guilty is conclusive like a jury verdict and court then proceeds to judgment)
