Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316

Background

In 2001 a masked gunman killed two people in a Wilmington barbershop. No physical evidence linked Chauncey Starling to the crimes; the State’s case rested primarily on testimony from Alfred Gaines and several eyewitnesses.
Gaines, who was shot in Pennsylvania after the barbershop killings, identified Starling as the shooter and testified at trial; he had probation-related capias and violation-of-probation (VOP) matters that were dismissed before trial.
At trial the State introduced (without a voluntariness hearing) a pretrial statement by Starling’s brother Michael saying he heard Starling apologize for the child victim; Michael’s interrogation included prolonged questioning, threats, and promises (raising voluntariness concerns).
Trial counsel failed to cross-examine eyewitness Lawrence Moore about his out-of-court statement that newspaper photos (one of Starling) did not match the shooter and that the shooter was substantially taller than Starling. Counsel also did not object to admission of Michael’s statement under 11 Del. C. § 3507.
The prosecution inaccurately told defense counsel before trial that Gaines’ capias and VOP charges remained pending (the State had in fact moved to withdraw/dismiss them), and did not disclose the dismissal to the defense.
After postconviction proceedings, the Delaware Supreme Court held that trial counsel’s failures and the prosecution’s nondisclosure cumulatively undermined confidence in the verdict and ordered a new trial.

Issues

Issue	Starling’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
1) Ineffective assistance for failing to elicit Moore’s exculpatory statements	Trial counsel forgot to ask Moore that he told an investigator the newspaper photos didn’t match and that the shooter was taller; this was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial given lack of physical evidence	Trial counsel need not elicit every piece of evidence; other witnesses testified about height/appearance, so no prejudice	Court: Counsel ineffective for failing to elicit Moore’s statements; prejudice shown because Moore had a superior vantage point and conflicts among eyewitnesses made his testimony potentially dispositive
2) Ineffective assistance for not objecting to admission of Michael’s taped statement	Counsel should have objected and demanded a §3507 voluntariness hearing because interrogation tactics (lengthy detention, promises, threats) raised serious doubt about voluntariness	Admission and playing of tape allowed jury to assess credibility; counsel’s decision to play tape was tactical waiver	Court: Counsel’s failure to object was objectively unreasonable and prejudiced Starling; voluntariness determination is for the judge and counsel should have forced that process
3) Brady violation for nondisclosure/misrepresentation of Gaines’ capias/VOP dismissal	The dismissal of Gaines’ capias/VOP was favorable impeachment evidence and the prosecution’s failure to disclose (and misrepresentation that charges were pending) violated Brady and was material given Gaines’ central role	No Brady breach because no quid pro quo; trial counsel knew Gaines’ probation status or would have risked opening Chester-shooting details; disclosure would have caused harmful collateral inquiry	Court: Brady violation occurred—dismissal was favorable, suppressed (or misrepresented) to defense, and material because Gaines was the State’s key witness without physical corroboration
4) Cumulative error warranting new trial	The combined effect of counsel’s ineffective assistance (Moore & Michael issues) and the Brady violation undermines confidence in the verdict	Errors were either harmless or individually insufficient to warrant reversal	Court: Cumulative effect prejudiced Starling’s right to a fair trial; reversed and remanded for new trial

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 ( prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory/impeachment evidence)
Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752 (Del. 1987) (State must disclose reductions or dispositions of charges against witnesses)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (Brady materiality standard — reasonable probability of different result)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (Brady/Bagley materiality framework)