Starks v. City of Waukegan, 946 F. Supp. 2d 780

Starks was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated battery; convictions later vacated on appeal and post-conviction review led to retrial opportunities.
The City of Waukegan, current/past police officers, dentists Hagstrom and Schneider, and serology expert Thomas-Boyd are defendants in a 9-count §1983 and state-law suit.
Counts include due-process, failure-to-intervene, conspiracy, Monell municipal liability, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), civil conspiracy, and indemnification; some counts stem from alleged fabrication/suppression of evidence and false testimony.
The court denied most motions to dismiss, except granting dismissal of Monell and IIED claims at various points, and later reinstated the IIED claim on reconsideration.
The court analyzed standing and pleading standards, scope of municipal liability, absolute immunity defense for witness testimony, and accrual/limitations issues for related claims.
Final disposition: Monell and IIED were addressed (IIED reinstated on reconsideration), Dentist Defendants’ motion denied on most counts; overall, claims proceed other than the Monell and (initial) IIED dismissal, with timing/accrual considerations central to the IIED issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Monell claim against City survives pleading standards	Starks pleads unwritten city-wide practices; City policy implied by conduct	Monell requires express policy or widespread unwritten practice with causal link	Monell claim dismissed; no adequate policy to support liability
Whether Count I due process claim survives absolute immunity	Allegations go beyond testimony; not limited to immunized conduct	Grand jury/trial testimony immune; other acts still ground §1983 claims	Count I survives; immunity does not bar broader due-process claim
Whether Count II failure-to-intervene states a §1983 claim	Officers knew of fabrication and had opportunity to intervene	Count II misattributes liability to prosecutors; failure-to-intervene not shown	Count II plausibly states a claim under Yang v. Hardin
Whether Count III §1983 conspiracy claim is sufficiently pleaded	Plaintiff alleges a conspiratorial agreement across defendants to secure conviction	Iqbal requires more concrete allegations tying individuals to a conspiracy	Conspiracy claim survives dismissal; allegations plausible under Iqbal/Geinosky
Whether IIED claim accrues timely under Illinois law	IIED claim timely under Heck accrual; renewed on reconsideration	Accrual at indictment or conviction; time-bar if untimely	IIED reinstated on reconsideration; Illinois adopts Heck accrual rule to allow timely filing

Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (U.S. 2012) (absolute immunity for trial/grand jury witnesses? (contextual))
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (U.S. 1983) (trial witness absolute immunity applies to §1983 claims)
Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1994) (failure-to-intervene liability under §1983 when realistic opportunity to prevent)
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading plausibility standard under Rule 8)
Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012) (pleading plausible conspiracy under Iqbal; pattern of harassment suffices)
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard; mere possible conduct insufficient)
Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2010) (Heck accrual rule for IIED claims arising from conviction; Indiana analysis applied to Illinois context in decision)
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009) (IIED accrues at indictment, not after ongoing trial, for certain contexts)
Lieberman v. Liberty Health Care Corp., 350 Ill. Dec. 593, 948 N.E.2d 1100 (Ill.App. 2011) (Illinois adopts Heck accrual for some Illinois-law claims)
Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2012) (discusses accrual rules and Heck in Illinois context)