Stant v. City of Maricopa Employee Merit Board
234 Ariz. 196
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- In May 2010 Maricopa Police Department began an internal affairs probe into whether an officer bypassed the chain of command by emailing city council; Sergeant Carlton Stant, the officer’s supervisor, refused to answer questions in a detective interview.
- Operations Order 3.19(3)(B)(2) required witnesses to cooperate; Stant testified he knew the order.
- Police chief terminated Stant on June 18, 2010, citing refusal to cooperate and prior disciplinary history.
- Stant appealed to the City of Maricopa Employee Merit Board; the board (advisory to the city manager) found the termination was "in good faith for cause." The city manager upheld the termination.
- Stant sought certiorari in superior court under A.R.S. § 38-1004; the superior court affirmed. Stant appealed to the court of appeals.
- The court of appeals considered jurisdictional questions but found appellate jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2007 and § 38-1004, and reviewed whether the board/city action was supported by evidence and lawful.
Issues
| Issue | Stant's Argument | City/Board's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate jurisdiction | Stant argued appeal lies under general appeal statute § 12-2101 | City argued superior-court review under § 38-1004 is an appellate-type special action but appeal beyond superior court is permissible | Court held jurisdiction exists (§ 12-2007 and § 38-1004 provide right to appeal) and appellate review is proper |
| Standard of review | Stant argued board must treat "in good faith" and "for cause" as distinct, particular legal standards | City/board applied MPP § 2.3.5(a) standard and explained separate consideration of good faith and just cause | Court held board appropriately applied the governing standard; superior court review is limited to certiorari scope (arbitrary/capricious or legal error) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for "good faith for cause" | Stant claimed termination was not for conduct any reasonable officer would recognize as punishable; urged narrower meaning of good faith | City/board relied on detective’s testimony, Stant’s familiarity with the order, and prior discipline to show reasonable basis for termination | Court held record contained sufficient evidence to support the board’s finding that termination was in good faith for cause |
| Applicability of Operations Order 3.19 | Stant contended the order applies only to employees under investigation or witnesses and he was neither | City’s interpretation: order reasonably applies to potential witnesses and duty to provide exculpatory information | Court deferred to the agency’s reasonable interpretation and upheld that the order applied to Stant’s refusal to answer questions |
Key Cases Cited
- Rash v. Town of Mammoth, 233 Ariz. 577 (App. 2013) (discussing special-action nature of § 38-1004 proceedings)
- Walker v. Burr, 73 Ariz. 129 (1951) (recognizing appellate rights beyond superior court in certain law-enforcement discharge reviews)
- Hamilton v. City of Mesa, 185 Ariz. 420 (App. 1995) (municipal civil-service plan with advisory board and limits on merit-system statutes)
- Walker v. Dunham, 78 Ariz. 419 (1955) (standard that superior court must find some evidence supporting prior determination)
- Juarez (Maricopa County Sheriffs Office v. Maricopa County Employee Merit Sys. Comm’n), 211 Ariz. 219 (2005) (distinguishing county civil-service appeal rights and standards)
