Stansbury v. McCarty Corporation
2:21-cv-01909
E.D. La.Jan 6, 2022Background
- Stansbury (plaintiff) alleges asbestos exposure at multiple New Orleans-area jobsites from the 1960s–1970s and now has mesothelioma.
- He sued in Louisiana state court (Nov. 2020) asserting negligence, product liability, and tort claims; trial was set for Jan. 18, 2022.
- Wausau (insurer/defendant) filed a third-party claim against Avondale (Huntington Ingalls) for contribution/virile share based on plaintiff’s admitted exposure at Avondale.
- Avondale removed the entire case to federal court under the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a).
- Plaintiff moved to remand, arguing the state-law claims predominate and that exceptional circumstances (his medical prognosis and impending state-trial date) warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
- The court concluded the federal removal was proper, the state claims do not substantially predominate, and the common-law factors do not justify remand; the motion to remand was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) | Removal improper because case is primarily state-law | Removal proper because Avondale satisfied federal-officer removal requirements; one federal claim suffices to remove entire case | Court agreed removal was proper under § 1442(a) |
| Whether state-law claims substantially predominate (28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2)) | Stansbury: state claims predominate because the federal aspect is only a third-party defense; remand is appropriate | Wausau/Avondale: claims arise from same facts (plaintiff admitted exposure at Avondale); third-party claim is intertwined and does not make state claims predominant | Court held state and federal claims are sufficiently intertwined; state claims do not predominate |
| Whether exceptional circumstances justify declining supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4)) | Plaintiff: dire medical prognosis and imminent state-court trial date are exceptional and warrant remand | Defendants: no exceptional circumstances; judicial economy and fairness favor keeping all claims in one forum | Court held plaintiff’s health and trial timing do not constitute exceptional circumstances that outweigh efficiency and fairness; remand denied |
| Common-law factors (judicial economy, convenience, fairness, comity) | Plaintiff: late-stage trial prep and desire to proceed in state court counsel remand | Defendants: single case resolution in federal court avoids duplicative proceedings; discovery and issues overlap | Court balanced factors and found they slightly favor exercising supplemental jurisdiction and retaining the entire case |
Key Cases Cited
- Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2011) (framework for weighing § 1367(c) factors and common-law considerations)
- United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (U.S. 1966) (state claims may be dismissed/remanded when they substantially predominate)
- Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (U.S. 1988) (treatment of remand under pendent/supplemental jurisdiction principles)
- Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2009) (no single factor dispositive in § 1367 analysis)
- Morgan v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 879 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2018) (one federal-officer removal claim permits removal of entire case)
- Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 817 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2016) (federal-officer removal principles)
- Lang v. DirecTV, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 421 (E.D. La. 2010) (when facts/evidence substantially overlap, state claims do not predominate)
- Crocker v. Borden, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. La. 1994) (remand where third-party removing defendant unrelated to majority of plaintiffs’ exposures)
- United Disaster Response, L.L.C. v. Omni Pinnacle, L.L.C., 569 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. La. 2008) (intertwined claims may preclude finding that state claims predominate)