Stansbury v. Commonwealth
2015 Ky. LEXIS 10
Ky.2015Background
- Jonathan Brock Stansbury lived with his fiancée Clorah Falconer; on Feb. 3, 2012, a fire damaged their home, smoke detector was missing, back door was locked from outside, and investigators detected petroleum odor and tornado-shaped burns.
- Falconer rescued many of the household pets; several items (phones, keys, Xbox, tools) were reported missing; Stansbury was later found hiding at a third-party’s residence and gave various explanations.
- A grand jury indicted Stansbury for attempted murder, first-degree arson, and as a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO); a jury convicted him and imposed a life sentence under the PFO enhancement.
- On appeal Stansbury raised multiple evidentiary and due-process arguments: limits on cross-examination of the arson investigator, admission of testimony about abuse of Falconer’s pets, prosecutor questioning about his origin/mental health/anger, and admission of certain sentencing-phase evidence.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but found palpable error in admitting certain sentencing-phase evidence (prior judgments identifying local victims and a dismissed charge) and remanded for a new sentencing trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stansbury) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court limited cross-examination of arson investigator | Exclusion prevented defense from developing alternate-suspect theory and denied right to present a defense | Questions were irrelevant/speculative; trial court invited hypotheticals; issue unpreserved (or harmless) | Preserved but no abuse of discretion — questions were irrelevant and exclusion did not deny due process |
| Admission of testimony that Stansbury abused pets | Testimony was improper "bad character" evidence and irrelevant | Stansbury opened the door by eliciting testimony about his care for the pets | No reversible error — defendant opened the door, so rebuttal evidence was admissible |
| Commonwealth questioning about Stansbury being outsider, mental illness, anger issues | Questions appealed to local/general prejudice and introduced improper character evidence | Much of the questioning was responsive; defendant opened the door; no preserved objection | Not palpable error — door opened by defense; not so flagrant as to render trial unfair; issue moot as to sentencing reversal |
| Admission of prior-judgment documents in sentencing phase (victim names and dismissed charges) | Introduction of victims’ names and dismissed charges inflated prejudice and violated sentencing-evidence limits | Commonwealth acknowledged but relied on prior practice/cited Handle | Palpable error: admission of local victims’ identifiers and dismissed charge was improper; remand required for new sentencing trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90 (Ky. 2007) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings)
- English v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1999) (abuse-of-discretion test)
- Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196 (Ky. 2003) (right to present a defense and due process limits)
- Henderson v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. 2014) (offer of proof and preservation under KRE 103)
- Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2005) ("opening the door" permits rebuttal evidence)
- Webb v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.3d 319 (Ky. 2012) (improper penalty-phase evidence can cause manifest injustice)
- Blane v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 140 (Ky. 2012) (prohibits introducing dismissed or amended charges in penalty phase)