Stanley v. Superior Court
141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675
Cal. Ct. App.2012Background
- Defendant was charged with two counts of murder; jury panel was impaneled with four alternates; multiple jurors sought and were granted exemptions during the trial setup and early proceedings; defense counsel participated in discussions about delaying and potentially dismissing jurors due to various personal reasons; the trial court proposed a plan to proceed only if at least one alternate remained and to dismiss the jury if none could serve; defense counsel did not object to the court’s proposed plan and later did not dispute the court’s statement that there was an agreement to proceed with the proposed path to a mistrial.
- Juror issues included two jurors with caregiving obligations, one with pinkeye, and one with a heart condition; the court sought to balance keeping jurors and preserving an alternate, ultimately leading to a dismissal of the jury and declaration of mistrial based on the court’s belief that the parties had consented.
- After the mistrial, defendant moved for dismissal on double jeopardy grounds, arguing lack of legal necessity or consent; the trial court denied, finding implied consent, and the petition for writ of prohibition followed.
- The reviewing court held the record supported implied consent, noting defense counsel’s conduct and statements during discussions reasonably led the court to believe consent had been given.
- The court ultimately denied the writ, emphasizing that defense counsel’s participation, including failure to object at critical junctures, supported implied consent under California law.
- The court underscored that the better practice is explicit on-record consent, but concluded that under the facts, silent assent given during evolving discussions could validly support a mistrial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defense counsel’s conduct impliedly consented to a mistrial | People: consent inferred from counsel’s conduct | Curry requires mere silence to be non-consent | Yes; implied consent supported by conduct |
| Whether Curry should control despite intervening developments | Curry governs silence-based consent | Fact pattern differs; conduct led court to believe consent | No; Curry not controlling given defense counsel’s active participation |
| Whether silence before mistrial can be treated as consent given prior conduct | Counsel remained silent at declaration | Silence alone cannot show consent | No; in this case silence is buttressed by prior conduct showing consent |
| Whether the record shows defense counsel had opportunity to object and did not, implying consent | Counsel had chances to object but did not | Counsel relied on trial court’s assurances | Yes; multiple opportunities to object were not taken, supporting implied consent |
| Whether the trial court’s conclusion of implied consent was reasonable given the circumstances | Record supports trial court’s implied-consent finding | There was no explicit on-record consent | Yes; record supports reasonable inference of consent |
Key Cases Cited
- Mitchell v. Superior Court, 207 Cal.App.2d 643 (Cal. App. 1962) (discharge of jury before submission; minutes and consent rules under Penal Code 1140)
- Hutson v. Superior Court, 203 Cal.App.2d 687 (Cal. App. 1962) (silence generally not consent; reserved for personal waiver concepts (rejected later))
- Valenti v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 199 (Cal. 1957) (dicta on double jeopardy; not directly controlling on silence as consent)
- Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 707 (Cal. 1970) (milestone: mere silence not consent; but facts here involve counsel-led agreement and evolving plan)
- People v. Boyd, 22 Cal.App.3d 714 (Cal. App. 1972) (implied consent based on defense counsel’s conduct)
- People v. Ramirez, 27 Cal.App.3d 660 (Cal. App. 1972) (continuance or re-seeding issues can imply consent)
- People v. Compton, 6 Cal.3d 55 (Cal. 1971) (limits on implied-consent when counsel states position but later refuses to object)
- Chaney v. State, 202 Cal.App.3d 1109 (Cal. App. 1988) (deadlock and mistrial; context differs from Curry)
- People v. Saunders, 5 Cal.4th 580 (Cal. 1993) (forfeiture vs double jeopardy considerations; policy context)