171 So. 3d 915
La.2015Background
- Plaintiff Truman Stanley III was injured when a gas cylinder exploded while a coworker attempted to fill it; plaintiff lost his right arm below the elbow.
- The cylinder had previously been marked “leak” and indicated a damaged spot, but the coworker did not see the marking and attempted to fill it.
- Airgas-Southwest (employer) had a policy to destroy condemned cylinders but the damaged cylinder was revalved and returned to service.
- Plaintiff sued Airgas alleging an intentional tort under La. R.S. 23:1032(B); Airgas moved for summary judgment asserting immunity under workers’ compensation exclusivity.
- The district court denied summary judgment; the court of appeal denied supervisory review; the supreme court granted writ, reversed, and entered summary judgment for Airgas, dismissing the intentional tort claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether employer acted with the intent required by La. R.S. 23:1032(B) to defeat workers’ compensation exclusivity | Stanley argued Airgas knowingly returned a cracked/leaking cylinder to service, and experts/employees testified such a cylinder is certain to catastrophically fail when filled, satisfying "substantial certainty" | Airgas argued no conscious intent to injure; coworker did not see the marking and would not have filled it had he seen it, so injury was not substantially certain | Court held plaintiff failed to show injuries were "substantially certain"; summary judgment for Airgas granted |
| Standard for "substantial certainty" under 23:1032(B) | Stanley contended the known danger and testimony that a cracked cylinder will fail when filled meets the substantial-certainty standard | Airgas relied on precedent that knowledge of risk or high probability does not equal intent or substantial certainty | Court applied precedent: substantial certainty requires more than high probability; must be essentially inevitable, and this was not shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Sattler Supply Co., Inc., 132 So.3d 386 (La. 2014) (sets intent/substantial-certainty framework under La. R.S. 23:1032(B))
- Moreau v. Moreau’s Material Yard, 98 So.3d 297 (La. 2012) (clarifies intentional-tort standard for employer liability under statute)
- Reeves v. Structural Preservation Systems, 731 So.2d 208 (La. 1999) (explains that belief an injury may eventually occur is negligence, not intent; defines "substantially certain")
- Jasmin v. HNV Cent. Riverfront Corp., 642 So.2d 311 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (discusses meaning of "certain" and "substantially certain")
- Armstead v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc., 618 So.2d 1140 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (knowledge of danger/high probability insufficient for substantial certainty)
- Tapia v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 590 So.2d 806 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (reckless/wanton conduct and risk appreciation do not constitute intent)