Stanley Jordan v. Chase Bank & Washington Mutual Homeowners Department, 366 So.3d 215

Pro se plaintiff Stanley Jordan sued "Chase Bank" and "Washington Mutual Homeowners Department" on Nov. 15, 2018, alleging Washington Mutual withheld flood-insurance/escrow disbursements after Hurricane Katrina and that Chase improperly required mortgage payments, causing damage and loss. He attached two escrow checks dated Mar. 13, 2006 and Dec. 3, 2007.
Plaintiff initially attempted service on a Chase P.O. box; Chase moved to dismiss for insufficiency of service and lack of personal jurisdiction; plaintiff later served Chase’s registered agent and Chase answered.
Chase filed a motion for summary judgment arguing FIRREA required exhaustion of administrative remedies (so the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction) and separately filed a peremptory exception of prescription, asserting claims accrued by Dec. 3, 2007 and prescribed by Dec. 3, 2017.
Plaintiff filed no opposition to the summary-judgment motion or the prescription exception; the district court granted summary judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, sustained prescription, and dismissed the suit with prejudice.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed and vacated: it held Chase failed to show the FDIC complied with FIRREA’s notice requirements (so FIRREA exhaustion could not be resolved by summary judgment) and found prescription questions required further factual development.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether FIRREA bars the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (subject-matter jurisdiction)	Jordan contends Chase was required to settle and did not; he did not argue FIRREA exhaustion in the record.	Chase contends the claim is functionally against failed Washington Mutual/FDIC and FIRREA jurisdictional bar applies because plaintiff did not exhaust administrative claims.	Reversed: Chase did not present evidence that FDIC complied with FIRREA notice requirements; summary judgment on jurisdiction was improper.
Whether the district court properly used summary judgment to raise lack of subject-matter jurisdiction	Jordan did not directly oppose the procedural vehicle; he argued failure to receive settlement offer.	Chase used summary judgment to raise FIRREA jurisdictional bar.	Court noted raising subject-matter jurisdiction by summary judgment is improper without developed evidence; reversal required for further fact development.
Whether plaintiff's claims are prescribed	Jordan did not present facts to show tolling or later accrual.	Chase argued last relevant disbursement was Dec. 3, 2007, so claims prescribed by Dec. 3, 2017, before suit.	Vacated: appellate court held prescription requires further factual development to determine accrual, cause characterization, and possible tolling.

Smith v. H & E Tugs LLC, 258 So.3d 159 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2018) (summary-judgment de novo standard of review)
Woodward v. Tadlock, 621 So.2d 875 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993) (caution that lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is improperly raised via summary judgment in some contexts)
Betancourt v. F.D.I.C., 851 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (FIRREA exhaustion can be resolved at summary judgment where FDIC shows compliance with notice requirements)
Rando v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 16 So.3d 1065 (La. 2009) (standard for appellate review of factual findings on prescription)
Williams v. International Offshore Services, LLC, 106 So.3d 212 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2012) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent)