Stanley Asher Wigley v. Shannon Medical Center A/K/A Shannon West Texas Memorial Hospital And Emmette Flynn, M.D.
03-17-00086-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 1, 2017Background
- On December 24, 2011, Stanley Wigley suffered a severe vehicle accident that rendered him quadriplegic; he was treated as a trauma patient in the Hospital’s ICU and developed pressure ulcers during his stay.
- Wigley sued the Hospital and Dr. Emmette Flynn for healthcare liability, alleging negligent failure to prevent the pressure ulcers.
- Wigley designated Dr. Lige B. Rushing, Jr. as his sole expert; Rushing is board-certified in internal medicine, rheumatology, and geriatrics and submitted an expert report asserting familiarity with pressure-ulcer care in hospitals and long-term care settings.
- After deposing Rushing, defendants objected to his qualifications under the Texas health-care-expert statutes and moved to exclude his opinions; they also filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion contingent on exclusion of the expert.
- The trial court excluded Rushing’s opinions as unqualified to opine about trauma/ICU care and causation and granted defendants’ no-evidence summary judgment because Wigley had no other evidence of standard of care, breach, or causation.
- Wigley appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion in excluding Rushing and erred in granting summary judgment; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Rushing as an expert on standard of care and causation | Rushing is a physician with substantial experience treating pressure ulcers in hospitals and long-term care and thus is qualified to opine | Rushing lacks practical knowledge or experience of pressure-ulcer prevention/treatment in the trauma/ICU context and so is not qualified under the Texas health-care-expert statutes | Court: No abuse of discretion; Rushing not shown to have relevant ICU/trauma experience and exclusion affirmed |
| Whether summary judgment was proper after exclusion of the sole expert | Excluding the expert was erroneous; with the expert Wigley had evidence of standard, breach, and causation | Once Rushing’s opinions were excluded, Wigley had no competent evidence on essential elements; no-evidence summary judgment therefore proper | Court: Summary judgment proper and affirmed because Wigley offered no other evidence of standard, breach, or causation |
| Whether an expert without same specialty may nevertheless testify about standard of care | Rushing argued an expert need not share the defendant’s specialty; his general pressure-ulcer experience sufficed | Defendants argued relevant practice is ICU/trauma care and qualifications cannot be inferred from general experience | Court: Expert need not have identical specialty, but must show practical knowledge of the specific circumstances; Rushing failed to do so |
Key Cases Cited
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2017) (standard of review for summary judgment is de novo)
- Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (summary judgment standards)
- Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1996) (trial court discretion to qualify experts; abuse-of-discretion review)
- Texas W. Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2012) (elements of a health-care-liability claim)
- Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P. v. Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d 453 (Tex. 2017) (expert need not be same specialty but must have relevant knowledge)
- Keo v. Vu, 76 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) (expert need not be specialist in defendant’s particular branch)
- Reed v. Granbury Hosp. Corp., 117 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003) (expert must show familiarity with hospital protocols or relevant practice to opine on institutional standards)