Stanila v. Joe, 2020 IL App (1st) 191890

Stanila filed an eviction (forcible entry and detainer) on Jan 24, 2019, and the parties’ counsel executed an agreed eviction order on Apr 3, 2019 requiring defendant Harvey Joe to vacate by May 14, 2019.
On Apr 30, 2019, Joe moved to quash service and to strike the agreed order, arguing the plaintiff mischaracterized the case and that Joe’s trial counsel lacked authority to agree to the eviction; after a May 10 hearing (only defense counsel present) the court struck the agreed order.
Plaintiff moved to reconsider on May 17; after briefing and a June 25 hearing the court granted reconsideration, vacated the May 10 order, and entered a new eviction order.
Joe filed multiple postjudgment filings: motions to dismiss (2-619) and a July 25, 2019 filing labeled “motion to vacate,” which substantively sought dismissal of the complaint; the court struck some filings as untimely.
On Aug 16 Joe moved to amend/recharacterize the July 25 filing as a motion to reconsider, arguing (inter alia) counsel lacked authority to enter the agreed eviction order; the court denied that motion on Sept 3 and barred further attacks on the eviction order; Joe appealed on Sept 18.
The central contention on appeal: whether Joe’s postjudgment filings properly tolled the appeal period (preserving jurisdiction) and whether he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s alleged lack of authority.

Issue	Stanila's Argument	Joe's Argument	Held
Whether Joe filed a timely, proper postjudgment motion that tolled the appeal period	Joe’s July 25 filing was not a proper postjudgment motion; it did not toll appeal time	The July 25 motion was a timely “motion to vacate” directed at the June 25 judgment, so the August/September activity preserved the right to appeal	Court: July 25 filing attacked the complaint (sought dismissal) not the judgment; it was not a proper postjudgment motion and did not toll the appeal period; appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether Joe timely raised the argument that his counsel lacked authority to agree to the eviction order	The contention was raised repeatedly and should have been considered; Joe sought an evidentiary hearing	The argument was not properly or timely presented as a postjudgment attack on the June 25 judgment	Court: issue was not timely or properly raised in a postjudgment motion; denial of further motions and refusal to hold hearing was not reviewable because appeal is untimely
Whether sanctions against Joe and his counsel are warranted	Stanila asked for fees due to frivolous appeal and misrepresentations	Joe denied frivolousness and argued issues were legitimate	Court: declined to impose Rule 375 sanctions — conduct did not meet the high threshold for frivolous or harassing appeal

People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32 (2009) (appellate courts have an independent duty to evaluate jurisdiction)
Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496 (1997) (final judgment definition for appealability)
Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253 (1981) (untimely or non-judgment-directed motions do not toll appeal time)
Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, 202 Ill. 2d 24 (2002) (postjudgment motion need not be detailed but must request appropriate relief to toll appeal time)
Hanna v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 176 Ill. App. 3d 938 (1988) (motion to vacate is among types of relief that can toll appeal time)
Heiden v. DNA Diagnostics Center, Inc., 396 Ill. App. 3d 135 (2009) (substance matters more than caption; a motion not directed at the judgment does not toll appeal time)
Shutkas Electric, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 366 Ill. App. 3d 76 (2006) (nature of a motion determined by its substance rather than its caption)
Holloway v. Kroger Co., 253 Ill. App. 3d 944 (1993) (a second postjudgment motion filed beyond 30 days attacking the same judgment does not extend appeal time)
Dreisilker Electric Motors, Inc. v. Rainbow Electric Co., 203 Ill. App. 3d 304 (1990) (definition of frivolous appeal in sanction analysis)
Fields v. Lake Hillcrest Corp., 355 Ill. App. 3d 457 (2002) (imposition of appellate sanctions is discretionary)