164 Conn.App. 49
Conn. App. Ct.2016Background
- Ten Rugby Street, LLC (defendant) operated a site in Stamford's M-G (general industrial) zone where it crushed, shredded, sorted, and sold construction, demolition, and excavation materials; zoning enforcement officer Lunney issued a June 21, 2010 cease-and-desist ordering cessation of a rock crushing enterprise, recycling preparation operation, and material transfer site.
- Plaintiffs (City of Stamford and Lunney) sued after alleged noncompliance; a multi-day bench trial produced documentary and video evidence and testimony from owner Antonio Vitti and neighbors.
- The trial court found the defendant’s primary business was recycling large amounts of others’ excavation/construction/demolition material by crushing and shredding into marketable products, that it operated a recycling preparation operation as defined in Stamford’s zoning regulations without a special exception, and that crushing (including non-rock materials) was not permitted as-of-right in a contractor’s material and equipment storage yard.
- The court concluded the use was not a lawful prior nonconforming use and granted a permanent injunction ordering removal/cessation of any crusher and compliance with the cease-and-desist order; no civil fines were imposed.
- Defendant appealed claiming (1) misinterpretation/application of Stamford zoning regs and (2) a due process violation because the injunction exceeded the scope of the cease-and-desist order and complaint. The Appellate Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether crushing non-rock materials fits any as-of-right permitted use in M-G zone (esp. "contractor's material and equipment storage yard and building") | City: crushing/sorting of construction/demolition materials is not an as-of-right contractor's yard activity and is regulated/forbidden except where specifically allowed | Ten Rugby: contractor's yard label is ambiguous; storing material should allow on-site processing/crushing; activity is permitted | Court: "contractor's yard" means storage of materials and equipment; primary crushing of non-rock materials is not permitted as-of-right in M-G and no other permitted use authorizes it |
| Whether the defendant's activities constitute a "recycling preparation operation" requiring a special exception under §82.1 | City: defendant's crushing, sorting, consolidating of construction/demolition/excavation materials falls within §82.1 (collection, crushing, shredding, sorting of solid waste materials) and thus requires a special exception | Ten Rugby: materials crushed are not "solid waste" or "construction/demolition materials" as contemplated; §82.1 does not apply | Court: §82.1 reasonably covers construction/demolition/excavation materials and similar materials; evidence showed defendant performed those activities without the required special exception; violation established |
| Whether the defendant's use qualified as a lawful prior nonconforming use (pre-dating the zoning regulation that triggered §82.1) | Ten Rugby: operations date back decades and thus pre-exist the current regulation | City: defendant bears burden to prove the nonconforming use existed when regulations were enacted; evidence did not show crushing/recycling at this site predated the 1990 definition | Court: defendant failed to prove a qualifying prior existing nonconforming use; expansion of operations after 1990 undermined claim |
| Whether the injunction exceeded the scope of the cease-and-desist order/complaint, violating due process | Ten Rugby: injunction broadly barred all crushing and some processing/screening beyond the original rock-crushing focus of the cease-and-desist, so relief exceeded pleadings | City: complaint and cease-and-desist put defendant on notice of recycling/rock-crushing/material-transfer violations; trial litigated scope; injunction tailored to prevent ongoing zoning violations | Court: injunction was within discretion; court’s factual and legal determinations (that non-rock crushing was regulated and part of recycling operation) were necessarily litigated and the defendant had notice; removing crushers was a permissible remedy to prevent violations |
Key Cases Cited
- Driska v. Pierce, 110 Conn. App. 727 (Conn. App. 2008) (interpretation of regulations is a question of law; factual findings reviewed forclear error)
- Johnnycake Mountain Associates v. Ochs, 104 Conn. App. 194 (Conn. App. 2007) (factual findings reviewed for clear error)
- Gordon v. Zoning Board, 145 Conn. 597 (Conn. 1958) (zoning regulations are permissive; uses not listed are excluded)
- Thomas v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 98 Conn. App. 742 (Conn. App. 2006) (rules for interpreting zoning regulations)
- Trumbull Falls, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 97 Conn. App. 17 (Conn. App. 2006) (avoid absurd or unworkable regulatory constructions)
- Builders Service Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 267 (Conn. 1988) (focus on common understanding where terms are undefined)
- Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 74 Conn. App. 622 (Conn. App. 2003) (burden on party claiming benefit of nonconforming use)
- Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, 245 Conn. 551 (Conn. 1998) (issues actually litigated may cure pleading defects)
- Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515 (Conn. 1996) (municipality seeking injunction under zoning enforcement need only prove the violation)