Stallard v. Bank of America, N.A., 137 F. Supp. 3d 867

Stallard, pro se, sues Bank of America alleging NBA and state-law usury and conversion claims.
In March 2006, Stallard opened an unsecured revolving account with MBNA America (predecessor of Bank) and later Bank of America; parties dispute whether the Bank or MBNA/FIA is the proper entity.
Initial account terms: $5,000 credit line with a $4,348 balance transfer; the account carried a 23.99% variable APR and a 3.00% transaction-fee finance charge.
Account statements showed current payment due, the effective APR, and which balance portion bore interest; statements were mailed to Stallard’s Virginia address and largely undisputedly received.
In October 2007, Stallard received a minimum payment notice with an amendment stating a fixed 27.98% APR; Stallard continued using the account and paying thereafter.
In January 2008, a $1,000 cash advance incurred the 3% fee, making the effective rate for that period 33.9%; Stallard paid through April 2013, ending with a zero balance.
In 2015, Stallard requested terms and conditions; the Bank sent a 2015 document reflecting a past-terms rate of 18% for re-opening, which Stallard acknowledges is not the original agreement; the court finds Delaware law governs the rates and grants summary judgment for the Bank.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Bank violated the NBA §85 by charging usurious rates.	Stallard contends the Bank charged illegal usury by exceeding lawful rates.	Delaware-law terms govern and the rate charged was within the valid contract terms.	Count I fails; rates were within a valid Delaware-governed contract.
Whether Stallard’s conversion claim survives.	Conversion because the Bank exercised wrongful control over Stallard’s money through excessive interest.	No wrongful exercise; funds not specifically identifiable; based on NBA terms.	Count II fails; funds not identifiable and no wrongful conversion.
Whether Driver declarations are admissible/deserving credit at summary judgment.	Driver is an interested witness, casting doubt on credibility.	Driver declarations are proper evidence; credibility issues do not defeat summary judgment.	Driver declarations are appropriate evidence for summary judgment.
Whether the October 2007 amendment was clear and conspicuous under Delaware law.	The amendment’s notice was not clearly conspicuous; use of the account after amendment does not prove assent.	Notice was explicit and the amendment satisfied statutory requirements; Stallard accepted by continuing to use/pay.	Amendment valid; assent established by use/payments.

Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (acceptance of contract terms by use or payments constitutes assent to terms)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard; burden-shifting framework)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (material facts in dispute require trial; but not just metaphysical doubt)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (mere existence of some evidence is not enough to defeat summary judgment)
Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2012) (preconditions for summary judgment in the Fourth Circuit)
Pelphrey v. United States, 674 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1982) (nonmovant must come forward with specific facts showing genuine dispute)