337 Ga. App. 381
Ga. Ct. App.2016Background
- Williams was indicted on two armed-robbery counts (July 31 and August 31, 2012); the counts were severed. He was convicted by jury of Count 2 (Aug. 31 robbery) and later entered an Alford plea to a reindicted Count 1 (July 31) and was sentenced.
- Counsel Wight filed a statutory speedy-trial demand on Williams’s behalf in January 2013; Wight moved to withdraw in March 2013 and new counsel Belisle agreed to represent Williams and to seek a continuance.
- At an April 16, 2013 calendar call Belisle (appearing for Williams) announced that the speedy-trial demand had been withdrawn and asked for a continuance; the written appointment order was entered April 22.
- Williams was tried on Count 2 in May 2014 (guilty) and filed a motion for new trial; he later pleaded Alford to the reindicted Count 1 and sought to withdraw that plea in 2015.
- The trial court denied the motion for new trial and denied the motion to withdraw the Alford plea; Williams appealed, asserting (among other claims) speedy-trial violation, right-to-be-present violation at the calendar call, and ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to move for discharge and failure to object to texts sent to the jury).
Issues
| Issue | Williams’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether speedy-trial demand was validly withdrawn | Belisle did not validly withdraw his demand because he was absent and had not personally waived it | Belisle, with Williams’s prior agreement, announced withdrawal at calendar call and thereby waived demand | Waiver effective; speedy-trial demand was withdrawn and discharge not warranted |
| Whether constitutional right to be present was violated at April 16 calendar call | Williams was absent and that absence affected his rights | The calendar call related to legal scheduling; Williams had agreed to continuance through counsel and did not suffer prejudice | No reversible error; right-to-be-present not violated |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving for discharge based on speedy-trial demand | Counsel should have moved for discharge; failure prejudiced Williams | Counsel had effectively waived the demand at calendar call, so a discharge motion would be meritless | No ineffective assistance; failure to make meritless motion not deficient performance |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to text-message printouts going out with jury (continuing-witness rule) | Allowing texts to go out violated the rule and counsel’s failure to object was ineffective | Texts were cumulative of trial testimony and other strong evidence; no reasonable probability of different result | No prejudice shown; ineffective-assistance claim fails |
| Whether trial court erred accepting Alford plea / whether plea withdrawal should be allowed | Strength of State’s evidence did not negate Williams’s innocence; counsel pressured plea | Record provided factual basis; Williams offered no testimony showing he would have gone to trial absent counsel’s advice | Alford plea properly accepted; plea withdrawal denied for lack of manifest injustice or prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (permits guilty plea while maintaining innocence if factual basis supports plea)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Armstrong v. State, 325 Ga. App. 33 (2013) (attorney’s voluntary withdrawal of speedy-trial demand can waive client’s demand even if client not physically present)
- Harpe v. State, 254 Ga. App. 458 (2002) (Alford plea requires factual basis supporting elements of charge)
- McKenzie v. State, 300 Ga. App. 469 (2009) (even if continuing-witness rule violated, cumulative evidence/overwhelming guilt may negate prejudice)
- Wilkins v. State, 291 Ga. 483 (2012) (explaining continuing-witness rule and unfair emphasis when written testimony goes back to jury)