St. Pierre v. State Ex Rel. South Dakota Real Estate Commission, 2012 S.D. 25

St. Pierre, a licensed broker associate for First Choice, signed a release on behalf of three sellers in violation of company policy prohibiting signing for others.
She did not indicate on the signature line that she acted for the sellers, and initially concealed that she had signed the sellers’ names.
First Choice’s compliance staff doubted the signatures due to timing, California addresses, mismatched handwriting, and a crumpled form with correction fluid.
St. Pierre admitted replication of signatures and later claimed oral authority from Pagan, who said he authorized her to sign but had no authority to bind one seller (Julie Huffman).
The Commission found dishonesty under SDCL 36-21A-71(15) but not forgery under SDCL 36-21A-71(32); the Commission imposed a one-year license suspension in abeyance with conditions including education, costs, and penalties; circuit court reversed, and this Court reinstates most terms but not the attorney’s fees portion.
The Court ultimately reverses the circuit court, reinstating the Commission’s discipline terms except the provision ordering repayment of the Commission’s attorney’s fees.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether St. Pierre engaged in dishonesty under SDCL 36-21A-71(15).	St. Pierre deceived First Choice about the source of signatures.	St. Pierre acted within internal policy context and did not commit dishonesty.	Yes, St. Pierre engaged in dishonesty under 36-21A-71(15).
Whether the Commission could order repayment of its attorney’s fees as an expense.	Attorney’s fees were recoverable expenses under SDCL 1-26-29.1.	No statutory authorization for attorney’s fees as expenses in licensee discipline.	No, attorney’s fees could not be recovered as expenses; reversal of that portion.
Whether the $1,000 penalty as a condition of withholding suspension was permissible.	Penalty was within statutory cap and permissible as part of discipline.	Penalties under the statute were already satisfied by earlier actions; risk of double punishment.	Permissible; penalties do not constitute double punishment in this record.
Whether the Commission’s disciplinary order was supported by clear and convincing evidence.	The evidence did not prove dishonesty beyond a reasonable doubt.	Evidence showed intent to mislead First Choice about signatures.	Yes, supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Leonard v. State ex rel. S.D. Real Estate Comm’n, 2010 S.D. 97, 793 N.W.2d 19 (2010) (great deference to agency findings; review for clear error in mixed questions of law and fact)
In re Fuller, 2011 S.D. 22, 798 N.W.2d 408 (2011) (notice pleading in disciplinary actions; implied consent for trial on issues litigated by evidence)
Sazama v. State ex rel. Muilenberg, 2007 S.D. 17, 729 N.W.2d 335 (2007) (pleadings put respondent on notice; evidence governs)
Tracy v. T & B Const. Co., 85 S.D. 337, 182 N.W.2d 320 (1970) (attorney’s fees generally not recoverable as costs unless statute allows)
Loewen v. Hyman Freightways, Inc., 1997 S.D. 2, 557 N.W.2d 764 (1997) (implied amendments and notice in ADR/discipline contexts)
Schrader v. Tjarks, 522 N.W.2d 205 (1994) (explicit authority to award certain expenses must be statute-based)
Olesen v. Snyder, 277 N.W.2d 729 (1979) (courts’ continuance powers not applicable to agency fee awards)
Brooks v. Milbank Insurance Co., 2000 S.D. 16, 605 N.W.2d 173 (2000) (context of statutory limits on penalties)