899 F.3d 500
8th Cir.2018Background
- St. Louis Heart Center sued Nomax in Missouri state court alleging Nomax sent twelve unsolicited fax advertisements lacking a TCPA-compliant opt-out notice (47 U.S.C. § 227; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200).
- The faxes included a box to request no further faxes, a domestic fax number, a phone number, and an email for a Nomax contact; six had a checkbox labeled to stop faxes and six had a similar checkbox with different wording.
- Heart Center alleged concrete injuries: loss of paper and toner, interference with fax/phone use, wasted employee time, and an invasion of privacy.
- During discovery Heart Center’s president conceded the suit was premised on defective opt-out notices, not lack of consent; counsel likewise said consent would not be litigated and some sample requests had been made.
- Nomax removed to federal court; the district court found Heart Center lacked Article III standing, dismissed with prejudice, and declined to remand. Heart Center appealed.
- The Eighth Circuit agreed there was no Article III standing but held the federal court must remand removed cases lacking jurisdiction, vacated the dismissal, and directed remand to state court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Heart Center has Article III standing to sue for alleged TCPA opt-out defects | Opt-out defects caused concrete harms (paper/toner loss, wasted time, privacy invasion); statutory violation creates intangible injury | Heart Center conceded suit is not about lack of consent; any harms (paper/toner, time, privacy) would occur regardless of opt-out technicalities | No standing: plaintiff's alleged injuries are not fairly traceable to the opt-out defects; therefore no Article III case or controversy |
| Whether technical noncompliance with opt-out rules can itself create a concrete intangible injury | A statutory disclosure violation can create a concrete risk of harm sufficient for standing | The actual opt-out methods on the faxes provided means/opportunity to opt out; no evidence the defect created a real risk of harm | No; here the notices conveyed means to opt out and plaintiff did not attempt to opt out, so no risk of real harm shown |
| Appropriate remedy where federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction after removal | Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate | Remand statutory requirement applies to removed cases lacking jurisdiction | Remand required under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); vacated dismissal and directed return to state court |
| Standard for district-court fact review on jurisdictional factual attacks | Court may consider materials beyond the complaint; factual findings reviewed for clear error | Same; defendant may present evidence challenging jurisdictional facts | District court properly considered extrinsic evidence and its factual findings were not clearly erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 2015) (district court may consider evidence outside the pleadings when subject-matter jurisdiction is factually challenged)
- Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1990) (standard of review for factual findings on jurisdiction)
- Florence Endocrine Clinic, PLLC v. Arriva Med., LLC, 858 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 2017) (loss of paper/toner and time can allege injury in fact under TCPA)
- Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017) (procedural TCPA violations may support standing when concrete injury shown)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (statutory violation alone insufficient; plaintiff must allege a concrete and particularized injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (traceability requirement for Article III standing)
- Hargis v. Access Capital Funding, LLC, 674 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2012) (dismissal for lack of standing in removed case—procedural posture discussed)
- Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2014) (when federal jurisdiction is lacking and case was removed, remand to state court is required)
- City of Kansas City v. Yarco Co., 625 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2010) (remand requirement stands because state courts are not bound by Article III limitations)
- ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) (state courts' competence to adjudicate matters beyond Article III constraints)
- Braitberg v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing bare procedural violations from injuries that confer standing)