1:14-cv-01632
E.D. Cal.Mar 30, 2016Background
- Janet Davis applied for SSI, DIB, and widow’s benefits alleging disability from December 31, 2005; initial/first ALJ denial was vacated and remanded by the Appeals Council for further development.
- After remand the ALJ held a second hearing (Sept. 5, 2013) and again denied benefits (Nov. 22, 2013); Appeals Council denied review, so ALJ decision became final.
- Medical evidence includes consultative exams (Dr. Shankar — normal physical findings; Dr. Castillo — GAF 74, few observable mental limitations), a 2013 psychological exam (Dr. Martin — GAF 60, checklist showing marked/moderate mental limitations), and treatment history including carpal tunnel surgery and orthopedic issues.
- ALJ found severe impairments (cervical degenerative disc disease, DJD of hands/knees, carpal tunnel post-op, migraines, depression, anxiety) but determined an RFC for a wide range of light work with limitations (occasional overhead reaching, frequent handling/fingering, no more than occasional public contact, only occasional ability to carry out complex/detailed instructions).
- Plaintiff argued the ALJ erred by (1) improperly applying a presumption of continuing nondisability, (2) improperly discounting Dr. Martin’s examining opinion, and (3) relying on the Medical-Vocational Rules. The Commissioner defended the ALJ’s evaluation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Presumption of continuing nondisability | Davis says ALJ improperly applied presumption despite changed circumstances (age category change, new/worsened impairments) | Commissioner says reference to presumption was inadvertent and ALJ actually reconsidered sequential evaluation and new evidence | Court: ALJ’s reference was error and not harmless because ALJ also erred in evaluating medical evidence, so the presumption error could be consequential; remand required |
| Weight given to Dr. Martin (examining psychologist) | Davis argues ALJ failed to give specific and legitimate reasons to discount Dr. Martin’s marked/moderate mental limitations | Commissioner argues ALJ permissibly discounted parts of Dr. Martin’s opinion as inconsistent with the record and other examiners | Court: ALJ did not provide the required specific, legitimate reasons or adequate explanation for rejecting Dr. Martin’s checklist limitations; error warrants remand |
| Consistency with record / examination findings | Davis contends Dr. Martin’s limitations are supported and ALJ misread inconsistencies | Commissioner points to earlier consultative opinions (Drs. Shankar, Castillo) and asserts ALJ reasonably resolved conflict | Court: While conflicts may be resolved by ALJ, here the ALJ’s conclusory finding of inconsistency was insufficiently explained under Ninth Circuit law |
| Remedy — remand vs. benefits award | Davis implicitly seeks crediting of evidence or further proceedings | Commissioner opposes immediate award, supports remand for updated evaluation | Court: Remand for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); not an immediate award because outstanding issues remain |
Key Cases Cited
- Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1987) (standard of review for ALJ factual findings)
- Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1995) (weight of medical opinions; standard for rejecting treating/examining opinions)
- Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988) (presumption of continuing non-disability and changed circumstances doctrine)
- Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may discount physician opinion for inconsistency with objective data)
- Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 1999) (inconsistency with record is legitimate reason to discount opinion but requires specific explanation)
- Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1988) (ALJ must do more than assert conclusions when rejecting medical opinions)
- Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996) (standards for remand vs. benefits award)
