Springs v. City of Charlotte
209 N.C. App. 271
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- TMOC employee Napier rear-ended Springs' van at red light; Springs' wife is wheelchair-bound due to MS and was seated in the van; Springs sustained shoulder/neck injuries with later avascular necrosis diagnosed in 2004; trial evidence linked Springs' right arm/shoulder condition to the collision; trial verdict awarded $800,000 compensatory damages and $250,000 punitive damages against TMOC; court denied JNOV and nudged remand for a written §1D-50 opinion and costs reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was sufficient evidence of causation for permanent injuries | Springs' evidence supported causation of avascular necrosis and shoulder pain by the collision | Defendants urged that Kingery's causation testimony was speculative and there were alternative causes | Yes; evidence supported jury's permanency finding |
| Whether punitive damages against TMOC were properly supported | Punitive damages warranted given willful or wanton conduct | Insufficient clear and convincing evidence of willful or wanton conduct | Remanded for written §1D-50 opinion; merits not decided here |
| Whether the trial court complied with §1D-50 requiring a written opinion | Court should uphold punitive damages given evidence | No written opinion was provided | Remanded to enter a written opinion explaining upholding of punitive damages |
| Whether the costs award complied with §7A-305 and §7A-314 | Costs properly include expert time for preparation | Only actual trial/testimony time and witness attendance allowed | Costs reversed and remanded to conform with statutes; expert preparation time not authorized per §7A-314, but §7A-305(d)(11) requires actual testifying time |
| Whether the court erred in not addressing the interplay of expert fees under multiple statutes on remand | Statutes allow discretionary expert fees in attendance and fixed testifying time | Statutes conflict/must be reconciled | Remanded for written opinion and reconsideration consistent with Scarborough Hudgins |
Key Cases Cited
- Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674 (1964) (necessity of permanency and proximate causation evidence)
- Matthews v. Food Lion, Inc., 135 N.C.App. 784 (1999) (direct testimony of medical certainty; cross-exam issues not nullifying proof)
- Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228 (2003) (medical certainty suffices for causation; speculation not required)
- Weaver v. Sheppa, 186 N.C.App. 412 (2007) (high degree of certainty as to cause supports verdict)
- Seay v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 N.C.App. 432 (2006) (causation evidence must indicate reasonable probability)
- Scarborough v. Dillard's, Inc., 363 N.C. 715 (2009) (1D-50 requires written reasons addressing evidence on punitive damages)
- Hudgins, N.C.App. , 694 S.E.2d 447 (2010) (remand for written opinion under 1D-50 when no opinion was entered)
- Sabol v. Parrish Realty of Zebulon, Inc., 77 N.C.App. 680 (1985) (scintilla standard; conflicts resolved for jury)
- Azar v. Presbyterian Hosp., 191 N.C.App. 367 (2008) (limits of causation testimony; multiple potential causes)
- Matthews v. Food Lion, Inc., 135 N.C.App. 784 (1999) (reiterated in causation discussion)
- Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227 (2000) (example of multiple potential causes in causation)
- Maharias v. Weathers Bros. Moving & Storage, 257 N.C. 767 (1962) (non-exclusive but illustrative causation analysis)