Sprenger v. Bickle
839 N.W.2d 59
Mich. Ct. App.2013Background
- Plaintiff alleges he is the biological father of a child born November 2011 to Emily (defendant) while she was married to Adam Bickle; plaintiff and defendant had a post-divorce relationship and were briefly engaged.
- Defendant remarried Bickle in August 2011; the child was born while Emily and Bickle were married, creating the statutory presumption that Bickle is the legal father.
- Plaintiff filed a paternity action under the Paternity Act seeking DNA testing, custody, parenting time, and support; defendant moved to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim.
- The trial court granted dismissal under MCR 2.116(C)(5) for lack of standing; plaintiff appealed.
- The majority affirmed: under Michigan precedent, only the mother or the presumed legal father may rebut the presumption of legitimacy unless a prior judicial determination between the husband and wife has declared the child not issue of the marriage; no such prior determination existed here.
- The court also held plaintiff was not entitled to discovery on the Paternity Act claim because he lacked standing; plaintiff later filed a separate action under the (new) Revocation of Paternity Act, not decided here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to sue under the Paternity Act | Plaintiff contends Emily’s statements to friends/family and possible DNA would rebut legitimacy presumption and give him standing | Only mother or presumed legal father may rebut legitimacy; no prior judicial determination between Emily and Bickle that the child is not issue of the marriage | Court: No standing—absent a prior judicial determination between spouses, a third party cannot pursue paternity under the Paternity Act |
| Entitlement to discovery | Plaintiff sought discovery (including proof Bickle was incapable of procreation) to establish standing | Defendant argued discovery unnecessary because plaintiff lacks standing to begin with | Court: Denied discovery—because plaintiff lacks standing under the Paternity Act, discovery to develop that claim was not permitted |
| Challenge/modification of prior divorce decree to address paternity | Plaintiff urged vacatur or modification of divorce judgment (fraud or omission re: pregnancy) so paternity could be adjudicated | Defendant argued plaintiff, as a nonparty to the divorce, lacks standing to attack or modify that decree; spouses are the only parties to divorce adjudications | Court: Plaintiff lacks standing to modify or vacate a divorce decree in which he was not a party; divorce silence does not equal a judicial determination rebutting legitimacy |
| Whether silence in divorce judgment can be treated as judicial determination of non-paternity | Plaintiff argued the divorce judgment’s identification of only three children implied the unborn child was not issue of the marriage | Plaintiff said the judgment’s specificity and Bickle’s alleged vasectomy made the judgment effectively determine paternity | Court: Silence in the divorce decree does not suffice; Afshar requires judicial proceedings between the spouses with admissions or explicit determinations—none here |
Key Cases Cited
- Pecoraro v. Rostagno-Wallat, 291 Mich. App. 303 (third party lacks standing under Paternity Act absent a prior judicial determination between the spouses)
- Aichele v. Hodge, 259 Mich. App. 146 (biological proof alone does not confer standing under the Paternity Act without prior judicial determination)
- Afshar v. Zamarron, 209 Mich. App. 86 (a divorce judgment may, under appropriate circumstances and mutual admissions by the spouses, be deemed to determine that an unmentioned child was not issue of the marriage)
- Girard v. Wagenmaker, 437 Mich. 231 (statutory requirement that a prior judicial determination be made before a putative father may proceed)
- In re KH, 469 Mich. 621 (only mother and legal father may rebut presumption of legitimacy)
- Barnes v. Jeudevine, 475 Mich. 696 (discusses limits on when a court determination rebuts legitimacy presumption)
- Serafín v. Serafín, 401 Mich. 629 (abolished Lord Mansfield’s rule; established clear-and-convincing standard to rebut legitimacy)
- Allen v. Allen, 341 Mich. 543 (historical authority vacating divorce decree for fraud where pregnancy by another was concealed)
- DeHaan v. DeHaan, 348 Mich. 199 (similar historical precedent addressing fraud on the court in divorce contexts)
- Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (Supreme Court discussion of presumption of legitimacy and traditional bases for rebuttal)