397 S.W.3d 419
Ky. Ct. App.2012Background
- Vaughn, the paternal great-aunt, was found by Greenup Family Court to be the de facto custodian of B.C. under KRS 403.270.
- B.C.’s parents admitted neglect in a prior dependency, neglect, and abuse proceeding in Boyd County, with emergency custody granted to Vaughn.
- Vaughn provided primary care and financial support for B.C.; she received kinship benefits for daycare but not as primary income.
- B.C. resided with Vaughn for a period exceeding the statutory minimum and Vaughn allegedly provided medical care and support during parental absence.
- Spreacker challenged Vaughn’s de facto custodian status, arguing Vaughn was not the primary financial supporter and that the time requirements were not met.
- Greenup District Court acknowledged Vaughn’s status as de facto custodian and the Greenup Family Court affirmed, prompting Spreacker’s appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Vaughn meets defacto custodian criteria under KRS 403.270 | Spreacker: Vaughn not primary financial supporter. | Vaughn: government benefits supplemented but did not replace primary support; she provided main care and funding. | Vaughn is primary caregiver and financial supporter; meets defacto custodian standard. |
| Whether Vaughn had the required residency period under KRS 403.270 for a child under three | Spreacker: Vaughn lacked required custodial duration since not placed by Cabinet. | Vaughn continuously cared for B.C. and no Cabinet placement occurred; statutory criteria satisfied. | Both statutory criteria satisfied; Vaughn met the residency requirement. |
| Whether tolling the six-month period by Spreacker’s participation is permissible under KRS 403.270(1) | Spreacker's participation tolls the period; she commenced action by participating. | Spreacker did not commence a separate action; participation does not toll the period. | Participation did not toll the period; the six-month requirement stands. |
Key Cases Cited
- S.S. v. Commonwealth, 372 S.W.3d 445 (Ky.App. 2012) (government benefits may supplement, not replace, primary support for de facto status)
- Swiss v. Cabinet for Families and Children, 43 S.W.3d 796 (Ky.App. 2001) (distinguishes traditional Cabinet foster care as not controlling here)
- Allen v. Allen, 2004 WL 1948741 (Ky.App. 2004) (unreported; evidence on monies expended varies; cited as distinguishable)
- Hudson v. Hudson, 2010 WL 2788274 (Ky.App. 2010) (unreported; relied upon as distinguishable)
- Roberson v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 634 (Ky. 2006) (standard for reviewing factual findings; substantial evidence)
- Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894 (Ky.App. 2005) (substantial evidence standard in factual review)
- Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1971) (definition of substantial evidence for appellate review)
- O’Nan v. Ecklar Moore Exp., Inc., 339 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1960) (substantial evidence standard; appellate review framework)
- Wheeler & Clevenger Oil Co., Inc. v. Washburn, 127 S.W.3d 609 (Ky. 2004) (plain meaning governs statutory interpretation)
- Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1998) (statutory interpretation and evidentiary standards)