Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp.
311 Neb. 262
Neb.2022Background
- In November 2016 Spratt, a truckdriver, suffered a work injury causing thoracic and lumbar back pain; treating physicians offered differing diagnoses (Donahoe: strains resolved; Gilmore: lumbar facet capsulitis and later thoracic pathology).
- Spratt petitioned for benefits; at a May 2019 trial the Workers’ Compensation Court awarded temporary benefits and medical rehabilitation only for the lumbar injury, finding the thoracic strain had resolved; Spratt did not appeal that award.
- After the award, Gilmore treated the lumbar spine, then concluded Spratt had reached MMI for the lumbar injury but still required thoracic treatment (including a herniated thoracic disk); Crete refused to pay because thoracic care was not in the original award.
- Spratt requested modification of the original award to cover thoracic medical rehabilitation; the compensation court denied modification, concluding it lacked statutory authority (relying on Dougherty) and that finality/law-of-the-case barred relief.
- Spratt appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court (bypass granted). The question presented: whether Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-162.01(7) authorizes modification of previously awarded medical/physical rehabilitation to add treatment for the thoracic back, and whether finality doctrines preclude modification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statutory authority to modify under § 48-162.01(7) | § 48-162.01(7) permits modifying previously awarded medical/physical rehabilitation to restore employee to gainful employment | § 48-162.01(7) does not allow adding services not specifically awarded; McKay limits modification to services already granted | Court held § 48-162.01(7) authorizes modification of previously awarded medical/physical rehabilitation as necessary to accomplish restoration or in the interest of justice; compensation court erred in concluding it lacked power |
| Finality / law-of-the-case | No incentive or reason to appeal original award because doctors’ diagnoses matched awarded services; discovery of insufficiency came only later, so law-of-the-case should not bar modification | Original award was final; relitigation should be barred by law-of-the-case/finality | Court held law-of-the-case did not bar modification here because Spratt lacked incentive to appeal earlier and only later discovered need for further treatment |
| Reliance on Dougherty v. Swift-Eckrich | Dougherty was abrogated by later legislative amendment adding modification authority for rehab services | Dougherty’s rationale is irrelevant if statute authorizes modification | Court found Dougherty was effectively abrogated by the amendment and the compensation court erred to rely on it |
| Waiver for not citing § 48-162.01(7) below | Although Spratt did not cite the statute, the compensation court understood and addressed its authority; omission did not forfeit review | Failure to cite the statute below forfeits the argument on appeal | Court treated the statutory issue as properly presented because the compensation court considered the question of its authority and was not prejudiced by the omission |
Key Cases Cited
- Dougherty v. Swift-Eckrich, 251 Neb. 333, 557 N.W.2d 31 (1996) (held comp. court lacked statutory authority to modify prior award; later legislative amendment responded to this decision)
- McKay v. Hershey Food Corp., 16 Neb. App. 79, 740 N.W.2d 378 (2007) (Court of Appeals held § 48-162.01(7) contemplates modification of services previously granted, not granting an entirely new category of services)
- Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011) (discusses limits of comp. court power and statutory authority)
- Gray v. Burdin, 125 Neb. 547, 250 N.W. 907 (1933) (early statement on finality of compensation court awards)