Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp.
311 Neb. 262
| Neb. | 2022Background
- In November 2016 Spratt, a truckdriver for Crete Carrier, injured his thoracic and lumbar back and reported ongoing pain and spasms.
- Medical opinions diverged: Dr. Gilmore diagnosed lumbar facet capsulitis (and ongoing pain), Dr. Donahoe diagnosed thoracic and lumbar strain that had resolved.
- Spratt filed a petition in April 2018; in June 2019 the Workers’ Compensation Court awarded temporary medical rehabilitation for the lumbar injury only (finding the thoracic strain had resolved). Spratt did not appeal that award.
- After further treatment, Gilmore concluded Spratt had reached MMI for the lumbar injury but that his thoracic condition still required treatment and generated lumbar symptoms; Crete declined to pay because the original award did not authorize thoracic treatment.
- Spratt sought modification of the original award to permit thoracic medical rehabilitation; the compensation court denied relief, concluding it lacked statutory authority (relying on Dougherty) and invoking finality/law-of-the-case. Spratt appealed.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding § 48-162.01(7) authorizes modification of previously awarded medical/physical rehabilitation services and that law-of-the-case did not bar modification under these facts.
Issues
| Issue | Spratt's Argument | Crete's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Workers’ Compensation Court had statutory authority to modify a prior award to provide thoracic medical rehabilitation | § 48-162.01(7) permits modification of previously awarded medical/physical rehabilitation to accomplish restoration to suitable employment | § 48-162.01(7) does not allow adding or redirecting services not originally specified; McKay supports that adding new categories is barred | Court held § 48-162.01(7) authorizes modification of previously awarded medical/physical rehabilitation services as necessary to accomplish rehabilitation (Dougherty was abrogated) |
| Whether the compensation court’s reliance on Dougherty v. Swift-Eckrich barred modification | Dougherty was superseded by statutory amendment that expressly permits modification of rehabilitation services | Dougherty’s reasoning still relevant; lower court’s reliance harmless if result correct | Court held Dougherty was abrogated by statute and the compensation court erred to rely on it |
| Whether preclusion (law-of-the-case/finality) barred Spratt from seeking modification after not appealing the original award | Spratt lacked incentive to appeal the original award because doctors’ reports and awarded services aligned; insufficiency only became clear later | Finality and law-of-the-case should preclude relitigation within the same action | Court held law-of-the-case did not bar modification here because Spratt had no opportunity/incentive to appeal earlier |
| Whether Spratt’s failure to cite § 48-162.01(7) below waived the statutory argument on appeal | The issue of statutory authority was presented to the compensation court and the court was operating within workers’ compensation law; omission of citation did not constitute waiver | Failure to cite statute below should preclude raising it on appeal | Court found the lower court understood the statutory-authority question and considered it; not waived under the circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Dougherty v. Swift-Eckrich, 251 Neb. 333 (1996) (held compensation court lacked statutory authority to modify award for clerical mistake)
- McKay v. Hershey Food Corp., 16 Neb. App. 79 (2007) (Court of Appeals held modification cannot be used to grant an entirely new category of services)
- Gray v. Burdin, 125 Neb. 547 (1933) (early precedent emphasizing finality of compensation awards)
- Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215 (2011) (discussed legislative amendment authorizing modification of rehabilitation services)
- Williams v. Dobberstein, 182 Neb. 862 (1968) (related to standards applied in compensation modification contexts)