Sprague v. Sprague
363 S.W.3d 788
| Tex. App. | 2012Background
- Bob Sprague and Deborah Sprague divorced in 2008; trial court divided community property and found a $1,807,509 separate-property interest for Bob in a lump-sum retirement benefit under two Shell defined-benefit plans.
- Jury's lump-sum separate-property finding equaled 25% of the $7,230,035 distribution; it excluded any separate-property characterization for amounts payable under Shell's Cash Deferral Program.
- The Shell assets include a Senior Staff Plan, a Benefit Restoration Plan, and a Cash Deferral Program; the Cash Deferral Program payments would total about $24.24 million over ten years.
- Deborah sought dismissal of the appeal under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine; the appellate court held Bob superseded the judgment and temporary orders allowed certain financial actions, so dismissal was denied.
- The trial court later entered a rendition and ordered liquidation of funds to Deborah; delays in transfer were challenged as sanctions, which the appellate court partially reversed on appeal.
- The appellate court reversed the property division and the sanctions order, remanding to determine community vs. separate property in Cash Deferral Program amounts and to achieve a just division of all community property.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper interpretation of section 3.007(a) and (b). | Bob argues Taggart/ Berry framework governs, and 3.007(a) controls value. | Deborah argues 3.007(a) applies as the controlling method with Berry-like accrual value. | 3.007(a) applies; value in dollars as of marriage; statute not codifying Taggart. |
| Whether lump-sum retirement benefits should be split under Berry/Taggart framework. | Bob contends half the lump-sum is his separate property under Taggart. | Deborah contends Berry limits community interest to marriage-period accrual and 3.007(a) governs value. | Court held 3.007(a) controls and the jury’s $1,807,509 separate-property finding is not unlawful. |
| Exclusion of evidence regarding Cash Deferral Program separate-property interest. | Bob claims exclusion was improper; some evidence would show separate-property interests. | Deborah argues discovery sanctions were proper given late disclosures. | Partial reversal: trial court abused discretion excluding non-expert evidence; remand for new trial on Cash Deferral Program issues. |
| Sanctions for post-rendition delay in transferring funds. | Bob challenges sanctions as unsupported or improperly found. | Deborah asserts sanctions were appropriate for delay and fees. | Reversed due to lack of basis for sanctions; trial court’s sanction order reversed and moot related fee order. |
| Dismissal of appeal under acceptance-of-benefits doctrine. | Bob benefited from judgment and should be estopped from appealing. | Deborah seeks dismissal under acceptance, estoppel doctrine. | Appeal not dismissed; supersedeas and temporary orders rendered doctrine inapplicable in this posture. |
Key Cases Cited
- Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469 (1950) (estoppel applies when benefits accepted; exceptions apply)
- Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (acceptance-of-benefits doctrine; exceptions apply)
- Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977) (defines time-allocation for community-interest in retirement benefits)
- Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983) (accrual-based valuation of community interest in retirement benefits)
- Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005) (supersedeas effect; consequences for acceptance-of-benefits context)
- McAlister v. McAlister, 75 S.W.3d 481 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002) (temporary orders and discovery-relief context)
- In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. 2011) (statutory interpretation; supports text-based approach)
- Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965) (value accrual; retirement benefits context)