49 N.E.3d 653
Ind. Ct. App.2016Background
- Volunteer Jason Clark signed a broad Release and Waiver before working in restricted areas at Sportsdrome Speedway and had volunteered ~60 times over two years.
- Clark was assigned the night of June 18, 2011 to stand alone at the Turn 4 pit gate (a gap in the crash barrier) as a stand-in for an absent employee; racing was being filmed that night.
- During a race a car rode the crash barrier, crossed the gap at the pit gate, struck the opposite barrier, pivoted outward, and landed on Clark, causing serious injuries.
- Clark sued alleging willful and wanton misconduct and gross negligence, alleging Sportsdrome knowingly exposed him to a probable risk by failing to supervise, train, and position him safely.
- Sportsdrome moved for summary judgment arguing the Release barred negligence claims and that Clark presented no evidence of actual knowledge by Sportsdrome that injury was probable (required for willful/wanton liability).
- Trial court denied summary judgment on willful/wanton claims; Court of Appeals reviewed de novo and reversed, holding the record lacked evidence Sportsdrome had actual knowledge that injury to Clark was probable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Release bars Clark's negligence claim | Clark conceded the Release would bar ordinary negligence claims | Release is valid and bars negligence claims | Release bars negligence claims; summary judgment should have been granted on negligence |
| Whether Sportsdrome committed willful and wanton misconduct by omission (actual knowledge of probable injury and opportunity to avoid) | Clark: being placed unsupervised on the ‘‘wrong’’ side of gate, lack of training, headset silence, and filming view create inference Sportsdrome knew injury was probable | Sportsdrome: record shows rare occurrences of cars breaching barriers; no evidence it had actual knowledge injury was probable | Held for Sportsdrome: plaintiff failed to produce evidence of actual knowledge that injury to Clark was probable; willful/wanton claim fails as a matter of law |
| Whether constructive knowledge or dangerous track layout is sufficient for willful/wanton liability | Clark relied on general danger and track design plus his positioning and lack of supervision | Sportsdrome: constructive knowledge insufficient; plaintiff must show actual knowledge of imminent/probable harm | Court: constructive knowledge insufficient; absence of specific evidence of probable imminent harm fatal to claim |
| Whether expert affidavits or other designated evidence supported willful/wanton claim | Clark offered no expert affidavits; argued facts sufficed to create an inference | Sportsdrome relied on established standard and designated deposition showing lack of prior similar incidents | Court: without expert proof or specific factual basis showing Sportsdrome knew injury was probable, summary judgment appropriate for defendant |
Key Cases Cited
- U.S. Auto Club, Inc. v. Smith, 717 N.E.2d 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (release bars negligence but willful/wanton claim requires evidence defendant knew injury was probable)
- Witham v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 561 N.E.2d 484 (Ind. 1990) (definition and elements for willful and wanton misconduct)
- Miner v. Sw. Sch. Corp., 755 N.E.2d 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (willful/wanton requires knowledge of impending danger and indifference to consequences)
- Obremski v. Henderson, 497 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. 1986) (equates "wanton and willful" with "reckless" disregard for others)
- Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 2014) (standard for reviewing summary judgment and burden-shifting under Indiana law)